uh slides prepared for this event but I
have some from a past talk that I can
use to kind of kick off the discussion
and I think that's more the framing is
just to have like a conversation with
the people here in this room uh but yeah
I can like tell you a bit about like the
state of things now in ethereum with my
Boost and PBS and things like that and
uh yeah then maybe that will seat off
the conversation and we can go from
there
so yeah I guess uh one question is just
like has everyone here heard of Med
boost
does this mean
anything yeah okay there's like maybe a
few nods so anyway uh maybe I'll just
start from the beginning and end
so we have ethereum we all we all know
and love ethereum and ethereum is cool
because it let you send transactions
which can do all sorts of types of
things with all these decentralized
applications it turns out that uh you
can basically uh you know craft the
blocks of ethereum in a certain way and
and a certain way it turns out that like
a builder of the block can get more uh
you know revenue or profit compared to
other ways we generally call this thing
M and point being is this poses a
concern for the protocol because um yeah
essentially if you're better at M
extraction than someone else then you
now kind of have this flywheel where you
can reinvest in your operations and you
just get bigger and bigger uh what this
could even look like right now is
offering better returns to validators
and then you have this flywheel where
like all the STI ends up with you and
ethereum is no longer centralized so
this is very bad and you know I think
the way we generally think about this uh
in terms of at least protocol research
is with PBS PBS here is proposer Builder
separation and it's thinking about ways
to separate off this building role of
these like very valuable execution
payloads uh in the protocol from these
validators right so what you could
imagine is there's this like very uh
even light layer of validators that are
again sort of attesting to the validity
of the network but then you entirely
fire allall off these concerns of uh
this me stuff and the point here is that
even if you do end up with like a very
centralized Builder or block Builder
world I mean even nowadays we talk about
like a transaction supply chain so it's
like very much professionalizing and
like
operationalizing uh even if that does
you know become more centralized than we
would like uh you still have this like
very robust Valor set that attests to
like the truth of the
chain
so is there a
question oh sorry
uh I'll keep going
so what else is there to say so PBS
right I guess from PBS then there's a
question
of I just killed it what happened oh my
computer went to sleep sorry so from BBS
there's a question of you know how would
you actually implement this and there's
a lot of ways to think about it you can
either do it you know I guess like one
high decision point is like is your PBS
onchain or offchain and we'll talk about
onchain flavors in a bit but given that
that you know um like an onchain setting
would be a protocol change it's probably
going to take a while to even come to an
agreement around what the best way to do
this and even right now maybe I'll talk
about this in a little bit but even
right now there's still like big open
questions around uh the best way to do
PBS in the protocol so what can we do
well in the meantime we can essentially
do PBS offchain and the implementation
we have that uh has the most adoption at
this point in time is M boost and I
think that'll team me up for
these slides so the way you can think
about this working is that uh it's
almost this like Grand service between
again Builders and proposers so these
proposers you know as you go to like
validate the chain uh as a validator you
then also have the opportunity every so
often to propose a block this is
building like the consistance block and
then also this execution payload and now
this is where the PBS comes in is you
can think about carving off the task of
building this execution payload the
execution part of the block where all
this like jucm is um and handing it off
to like someone else and me boost again
is a software stack and a protocol that
implements this and one way to think
about it is yeah you have this like uh
this green sort of rectangle over here
is like the execution payload the gold
is meant to like represent the M around
it because it's like this nice money
Everyone likes to fight over and then
you have this Blue Block on the right
and this is the consistence block um
that the proposer wants to you know send
to the network and the question now is
like how do you have like this uh you
know secure exchange between these two
parties who might not trust each other
and in fact we don't want them to trust
each other
uh because otherwise again you kind of
fall back to the status quo I was
talking or not the status quo but you
know a failure mode that I was talking
about a minute ago where you have like a
very small Valor set that all works with
these like you know one or two Builders
and things like this so in any case uh
you know we now have to think about how
to get uh this block uh the execution
payload into the block and make this all
work
well and at a high level the way to
think about meus today is that it's like
this commit reveal protocol meaning you
like commit to something and then once
you've committed to it it you know the
person committing now is the proposer
but once they committed to it uh then
the the Builder is free to like release
their block with with no
worries and you know diagrammatically
you can imagine that the builder then
has their like nice green execution
payload it has like some juicy M with
that gold border and then then uh the
like shaded thing on top of it is meant
to represent that it's blinded and the
reason why you want this is because if
the Builder sent the payload and clear
then the proposer basically could like
copy the Builder's work take all the
sort of you know rewards from that work
for themselves and the Builder would be
unhappy what this means then is that the
pro like the mechanism itself is not
sound and then no one would use it and
it would be bad because proposes would
just fall back to like these backroom
deals and God knows what so the way to
get around this is basically you need
some way for the proposer to commit to
the block this is a commit step uh and
so they get a blinded payload which goes
into the block the way this works is
that you know sort of like zooming way
into the details the proposer signs over
this block in a compatible way with
what's actually uh the thing that ends
up on
chain and uh yeah basically they do this
and then they can show the Builder kind
of as proof that like they've committed
to this particular payload say including
one that pays the Builder for their work
and then once the Builder sees that they
can release it to the Wild and this
bottom right square is what would go on
chain and yeah so the thing to consider
here is like this sort of me stealing
issue that I was just trying to describe
like you can imagine that there's a
block with some M the builder takes like
some amount of funds to that address and
wants to pay the proposer this if there
isn't this like commit reveal step baked
in to the protocol then the the proposer
basically could just take the block say
thank you very much for all this hard
work they could rewrite the payment
transaction for example that sends all
the revenue to the proposer and then
Builders don't want to use it there's no
Builders no proposers use it and again
we don't have some sort of PBS to
protect the Valor set from pressures of
centralization so that's
bad okay so that's like kind of a very
high level rview of like PBS today
offchain and how it works and yeah so
this has been live basically since the
merge so for a few years now and at this
point it's like an even more complicated
picture in this cuz now there's like
solvers and like bundlers before they do
7 and yeah like every day you know new
parties come online that are part of
this like transaction supply
chain but all being said uh just to give
you a sense of like what this looks like
right now uh you would have the
validator here that's labeled they use M
boost to talk to these different relays
uh which I'll talk about more in a
second the relays then interact with
Builders and you have this so I called
out this relay actor this one's like
very important and pretty much the
source of all of our problems with this
system today um the relay basically act
acts as like a trusted broker between
proposers and Builders otherwise there's
not like a nice way to like trustless
have this exchange that I just laid out
with this commit reveal protocol and
because of that uh yeah you need the
relay the relays exist what this does it
adds like another intermediary into
things that can have its own issues
whether that's being a single point of
failure or especially with concerns of
censorship and yeah you know these
things also have bugs and like can go
down and there's just a bunch of
headaches that come out of this uh but
this is what we have today and yeah if
you follow the space at all you've
you've heard about these relays I'm
sure so yeah again like the system
shipped around the merge and yeah uh
again these numbers are a little dated
but what I can probably do is even just
go here right
now uh here we
go and you can see that they should look
about the same so yeah I mean you can
see here like there's over 90% of blocks
say in the last two weeks have uh gone
through the system so people like it
people use it um again it like adds
extra me uh you know extra Revenue to to
your block uh for example you could say
the average payment here is like 005 but
I think we'll see a bit later the
they're are like very outli like there
are payments that are very much outliers
and they sometimes pay quite a
bit um yeah I mean one thing you can see
here is that there are like 12 relays uh
and 31 Builders registered or at Le like
observed which is like pretty nice for
decentralization
purposes um but yeah I think I'll touch
on in a second that the pictures uh not
so great once you get into actual
details so anyway point being uh people
use me boost and it's what we have today
and you know it works um which is cool
however there are some uh some
downsides the downsides here are that uh
since you're
especially at this like relay actor I
was talking about like quickly entered
the chat meaning like within you know
pretty soon after like the launch of
this system uh it became clear that like
relays and Builders would be censoring
certain transactions and this like
directly harms ethereum's values which
is not good um again I can actually go
grab the web page here to see the latest
data I know it's improved a bit uh since
here but in any case uh people were very
concerned uh about this and still are
right I mean it could be the case that
like new relays enter the the the market
that uh get a lot of adoption and they
start censoring and again we have the
same problem um yeah so maybe if this
isn't self-explanatory uh basically it's
saying that uh right basically this like
red blob is like sensoring uh the green
or not and yeah let's actually go check
because it's right
here so that's over for the last day
we'll get this nice
graph right so you can see
here okay I mean this doesn't look
great uh point being is that yeah I mean
CIP is still very much a problem um and
yeah so we want to think about ways to
improve
it another thing that's maybe not quite
well I think there's like two points
here so like one point here is that you
know there's not just a censorship issue
with relays there's also very much a
concern of um yeah the system not being
secure right so just in terms of like
this is software running out the world
there can be bugs accidents happen
sometimes there uh harmless accidents or
at least like not malicious um say relay
goes down um what this would likely mean
especially in the MEO context is if like
the relay can't get the final block out
in time then like the slots basically
missed uh the logic here is that the
proposer has already committed to a
particular block they want to
essentially buy from the Builder and if
the relay can't you know facilitate the
whole auction or exchange then uh the
proposer is just out of luck and then we
miss a slot uh in the protocol right so
sure it's maybe just one slot but
generally this this is
bad um so there's like some security
things which I think already are like
make people uncomfortable with relays
and that being said there can even be
malicious attacks right and so you might
you again if you follow space You' heard
about this one the low carb
Crusader um L what did I want to call
out here I
think right so I think the point here
with the call outs is that this was an
incredibly profitable attack um I don't
again I don't know how many people are
familiar with this but basically what
happened was there was a bug in the
relay implementation at the time where
as a validator you could basically trick
the relay into giving you the block
without having to commit to it uh and so
that's exactly what these attackers did
and and they also did a bunch of other
very clever things to then also in turn
uh mess with the transactions in the
payload if you've heard of like
Searchers in this context there are
people who are like making different
trades to like ARB say Unis swap or
different different token
pools and um yeah they even like went as
so far as like bait the Searchers who
were trading and then basically sandwich
the sandwiches that makes sense and
anyways it was actually a very like it's
a very fascinating attack and I would
recommend reading up on it uh but that
being said this is very bad
so um yeah again we just see more and
more cases where relays are causing
problems and it'd be nice to get rid of
them so well okay before I get to here
uh maybe like another sort of new update
uh since I made these slides is like
also the question of like relay
sustainability and this is actually
quite a big one because again over 90%
of blocks are coming through the system
uh there are effectively like a very
small number of relays I know that the
me. piix website should more but you
know in terms of market share it's
really a small number and I may actually
yeah so let's do this just to make the
point right so these are looking at
relays and you can see here so this is
basically breaking them down by market
share and really just you can look at
the pie chart on the right so we see
basically yeah there are like a number
here but you know flash Bots only has 5%
uh as a relay and then otherwise you
have BLX route uh which is here then you
have another Blox route relay and then
ultrasound so honestly there's like
three relays that have pretty much
dominated the market um and really you
know this one is like honestly just one
relay so yeah that's that's not
ideal we can do the same thing for
Builders if this
loads okay yeah so if anything this
looks even worse um again so the left
and right here the left one is just also
including like nonm boost blocks so for
the purposes of now you can kind of just
ignore it on the right here you see uh
for All Med boost blocks you know who's
responsible for what and you really see
it's just these two Builders here right
uh this is this is very bad I will say
these two Builders are like quote
aligned a lot more than like random
Builders could be but again you could
imagine a much more unaligned actor
comes to the table in the next year or
two say like one of these more like
traditional like uh institutions like
these big trading firms and they could
just Dominate and care even less about
like ethereum's values and things like
this and maybe just to give you another
view on
this you know you can go to Ether scan
these days and then you can see like it
it gives you the minor but really they
just mean like the the Builder here and
yeah it's like Beaver Titan okay someone
from Lio this one's fine like Titan
Titan Titan you know it just it keeps
going beaver beaver beaver TI Titan
Titan Titan like it's really not like a
great picture
so if anything there's now like two
levels of concern here there's like
relay decentralization and also Builder
decentralization and people think about
both these parts of the stack um and
yeah there honestly just aren't like any
silver bullets yet because it's actually
like quite hairy once you get into it
but yeah
so given all of this you might even be
wondering why we did this in the first
place because it sounds like it's
actually pretty bad
and you know I won't lie it's not great
uh but that being said now the question
is well okay are there things we can
start to do via the protocol that would
uh remove some of these trust
assumptions are there like other
protocol features that would play into
this like you could imagine that we have
Builders but then they are subject to
like inclusion list or something like
this uh and that might fix the
censorship problem so there's like a lot
of things we could think about and the
question then is just what um and once
you get into this Rabbit Hole vpbs you
find it like is perhaps infinitely deep
I don't think anyone's found the bottom
yet
uh there's like a number of different
flavors of design uh there's many
different concerns across the design
they touch all parts of the protocol
from like Fork choice to uh block
production to the incentives around you
know making blocks and attesting to
blocks and yeah just it's it's like a
very core part of the protocol and it
touches a lot of
things one thing we could start to do is
get rid of this relay um and the way to
think about this is like you can imagine
the relay itself becomes the protocol
uh somehow like yeah this protocol is
now going to like be this like broker
between Builders and proposers and you
want to do this in like a safe
way uh there is this bit about
optimistic relay I we can talk about
this if you guys are curious I think I'm
going to skip this for now but it just
is referring to a mode of operation of
the relays
today and yeah this might be more
interesting to think about for today
essentially like yeah flavors of PPS so
we C out here EPS PTC uh there's this
payload timeliness committee and
essentially yeah there's now an EIP for
this EIP 7732 that is a proposal to
implement this design um the way to
think about it is yeah you just kind of
remove the relay uh and now effectively
the protocol act as a relay in some
sense uh a key bit here is you need to
have like trustless Builder payments uh
because otherwise again you could
imagine the proposed like I was telling
you a few slides ago the proposer could
just steal the Builder's work and so the
the protocol work in a way that you
basically have this money locked up and
then it could be used to paid out
regardless of what the Builder does or
doesn't do or the proposer does or
doesn't do so that's pretty cool and
what else do I want to say about PTC at
the
moment um yeah I mean interesting part
of the design lately is that uh you
could even imagine like the the builders
and proposers directly talk to each
other because again the way the the
protocol works is you get a lot more of
these like assurances in the protocol
itself and so then uh yeah you can very
much imagine relays going away that
being said there are a number of things
relays I think still would even do in
this world around either providing
essentially low latency as a service or
like a number of other like uh nice to
have features like cancellations are
another one and there's more we can
probably think of um so yeah I think
it's very much an open question to what
extent uh this particular design is
actually going to like solve this pain
point of the
relay and yeah so this now I think that
might be everything that I want to call
out at the
moment this is some stuff yeah I mean
there's always an infinite Buffet of
things to talk about um yeah maybe I'll
just throw up this slide which is kind
of
nice and yeah so I guess from here uh
maybe we can open it up I don't know if
anyone has questions or concerns
anything they'd like to discuss you
could even come up here and grab a
mic okay I don't know how to access the
Q&A is it in some chat
somewhere
um oh here we
go here there's questions up here um
okay so removing Rel layers each
validator will have to discover and
manage the builders they connect to
will it's just not cause disconnect to
the two biggest ones and forget about it
entrenching them yeah so again I think
there's like a number of questions here
on this
and let me grab
up so maybe to add some context this
question is thinking about the latest uh
EPS design that I mentioned with EIP
7732 and the idea here
is it's perhaps even pitched as like a
benefit of the CIP that uh you don't
need the relays because again the
protocol handles all the like trusted
bits for you and so then a proposer can
just directly connect to the Builder um
one issue I think you could immediately
see with this is just like privacy
considerations so now the problem is
that you know if I have my validator
let's say I'm even just like a home
Staker and I don't have a sophisticated
way to like off office skate all of this
if I disc connect to a builder then like
they have my IP and they can start doing
bad things possibly for for example if
it's myp they now have a Target to like
Doss and so you could basically just
like get a list of these things and just
wait until someone comes up that you
want to Doss and then what this would
look like is suddenly the chain goes
down so that's not great uh this
question then is in that context asking
right in a 7732 world if you get rid of
them in this way uh and just yeah have
validators connect to the people they
want to um right would you basically
just have like the same entrenchment
going on so I think this is another good
point
[Music]
um I mean that I agree with I mean just
I guess to be transparent I'm not like
sold on 7732 but that being said the
concern here is that yeah even today
it's really hard to get new validators
to connect or maybe I'll frame it this
way it's really hard for new relays to
get adoption by validators like it's
almost this BD effort for them to go out
and like track down all these validators
because again it's like ethereum is
actually decentralized so like it's very
hard to even like know who to talk to to
like let them know you exist
um and so because of that yeah you could
see this sort of effect where even if we
have this world like validators still
may just go to like the names they know
simply because that's what they've been
doing and yeah I mean if anything uh I
think there's some good parts of 732 but
I do have some concerns around um yeah
especially this point of like removing
the relay I think it might provide an
opportunity for relays to be used less
but I don't think they'll go away and
yeah that is what it is
uh thank you so next question in early
discussion of Max EB it was said that
collapsing the set was a prerequisite
for epbs and ssf is that still
considered to be the
case um I'm not sure about
epvs I mean yeah if someone else in the
audience can think of something we're
all yours um I don't think so much about
ups but definitely so ssf so uh ssf
again is maybe a bit off topic but the
idea is basically uh like right now the
way the protocol works is there's a
notion of finality once enough
validators have essentially voted on
like a block in the chain and right now
again because we want ethereum to be
decentralized we have the protocol
designed in a way where like many
validators can come to the table this is
kind of at odds with like getting this
like a very fast finality because they
need time to basically share their
messages and run the protocol and all
agree and ssf is short for like single
slot finality and again it's like a
research direction that wants to say
okay can we like again have finality in
a single slot rather than like the
current uh protocol of say like an Epoch
or so and yeah so in this case so max CB
sorry there's like a lot of context here
so max CB uh this is an EAP I believe
it's 7251 coming into uh Petra the next
hard fork and basically this does like a
number of things but one thing it does
do is allow a validator to be
represented uh with like much higher
stake and so what that means is today in
the
protocol
um beam chain question interesting uh in
the protocol you basically have every
validator that has like a fixed stake is
the way to think about it they all kind
of look the same and this was done
because it's much easier to reason about
especially like a large number of
validators if they all kind of look the
same and there's no like special you
know jewelry hanging off of any of them
but uh this also kind of artificially
inflates devel set and is at odds with
things like ussf so it would be much
nicer for even if you are still a single
entity you know say you come with
like you know more than 32 eth uh you
know it's nice to just go ahead and like
have that in the protocol be represented
as one validator versus like you know
say you have 64 wath rather than two
validators you can now be
one all that is to say that now with
this feature there's a another part of
this that lets you consolidate
validators and then you start to see how
we get to fewer validators in the
protocol it makes ssf easier for like
some other technical reasons and We're
Off to the Races
so cool I guess I'll go to this next
question thoughts let me go to the next
question simple cue what happens
internally within relays um do they just
relay the best block okay so relays do a
lot uh this is actually a fun question
so relays do a lot and if anything they
keep doing more and more over time so
one way to think about relays is
that okay so they're running an auction
and it's kind of this like two-sided
Marketplace is way thinking about it
again between proposers and Builders and
maybe just kind of walking sequentially
through the flow the way you could think
about this is that Builders build blocks
they also need to be watching the chain
to know like the latest head to know
like what the next valid block could be
but on top of that they don't just want
the next valid block they want the next
valid most valuable block so they do
their thing you know sorts in order flow
from various places to make a very
sophisticated block uh that pays them a
lot of money and so Builders are doing
their things they eventually at some
point in time have a
payload uh there's sort of like a I mean
there's a spec but if anything there's
like an implicit agreement that relay
support very like a specific sets of
ways to like have Builders pay proposers
and so then the Builder makes the block
out of whatever Revenue they happen to
find they then make a payment in a
particular way which usually you know a
way to think about this is they just
staple a final transaction on that pays
the proposer uh some amount that amount
then is basically their bid and the
auction for that slot so then the
Builder submits the block to the relay
the relay gets this they then do a bunch
of stuff one thing they do is they take
the block they validate it locally
because you know a builder again
Builders are it's like an open set of
Builders as well a builder could just
like be spamming a relay with like
garbage so they have to validate the
block they validate the block with
respect to the protocol but then also
this like sort of subset property that
uh it it sort of follows again this like
PBS protocol of my Boost uh and so a key
thing here is like uh this payment this
payment that the proposer actually
receives some payment so they do all
that then from there they can extract
out what looks like to the proposer as a
bid the bid says like some metadata
about uh the block maybe like the block
header and then also the value
question of the of the
proposer uh so yeah right
uh so there's a step before all this
which is that uh as you start your node
let's say you're validator you start
your validator your CL and El also run
by Boost when it does this you tell your
consistent client that you want to use
uh use this external network and as part
of that then it basically sends these
like registration messages to the relays
you've configured via me boost um right
now it actually happens like once in
Epoch or something so like pretty
frequently but in that message you say
hey I'd like to register like I'd like
to be in your your you know set of
validators that Builders could build for
and as part of that message there's like
a proposer payment address so then
separately this is again why Builders
need to be watching the chain because
they need to see you know say they have
like an Epoch of look ahead on the next
who the next proposers are when they say
oh I want to build a block for you know
the millionth slot they can go look and
see ahead of time who the millionth
proposer will be and then they can go to
the relay and get the payment address
there and that's who they pay
yeah okay so we in the relay they
validated the Builder side of things
they now have a bid and the bids can be
served and there's like some apis that
Meo knows how to call so then when it's
time for the proposer to Now sort of uh
let's say accept a bid out of this set
of bids uh this is all time such that
again because we registered the CL knows
to call the relays at least it knows to
call me boost the way to think about me
boost is like this little slide car
software that's essentially a
multiplexer across multiple relays and
again like you don't want to work with
just one party it would be nice to be
able to work with like many of them and
in practice that's what people do so now
the way it looks as a proposer is as
you're about to propose for your slot
you're like oh hey I want to use this
external you know building Service uh so
then you know a little before my slot I
start talking to them and then you call
all the relays you
configured uh uh they then respond with
these bids so you know on this other
side of it actually maybe if I had a
whiteboard this would be easier but
anyways just follow along so if uh we
got to this place where Builders are
putting blocks into the auction relays
are exposing bids the proposer then VM
boost is calling multiple relays for
bids they now have like a pile of bids
and they can pick whatever they want I
mean the way the protocol works right
now is that they pick the highest bid
because you know we assume people want
to be maxing Revenue
so then out of the set of all bids you
get for your slot say you pick the
highest one from there we get to this
like commit reveal game that I was
talking about where as part of the bid
the validator has the block header that
can go in a compatible way uh into their
consensus block they can then sign that
and this is the same signature that
would go on chain so that's like a nice
property that makes this work a lot
better once the proposer has this signed
message um that commits the proposer to
this exact Builder's payload they send
that to the relay the relay then can
validate that and that's actually the
bug I was talking about with the low
carb crator that the relay at the time
did not validate that signature
correctly which was a huge problem uh
it's been fixed now but in any case you
validate the block and then if it all
looks good you can really at that point
like in relays do this as well they
should send the payload like the
Builder's payload to the proposer but
they really don't need to like at that
point the relay has all the day they
need to make the next Block in the chain
and they can just gossip it out uh and
you do both like relays gossip things
they send it back to the proposer and
they gossip it themselves as
well
so okay that was a lot the story keeps
going I don't know how much we want to
get into this but um yeah I would say
that's like the basic flow and then from
here even in like the last year year and
a half we've seen more optimizations I
guess this is the next point to make is
that time is money and what this means
is that there's like again this like
very
sophisticated you know pipeline or like
supply chain of actors and the way to
think about this is because of the way
MV Works uh basically yeah every even
like millisecond is like some money to
some you know in practice these Builders
usually end up being like very
sophisticated Financial entities they're
like uh are being like centralized
exchanges against decentralized
exchanges and all sorts of things like
this and in this case like it VAR as
much the case that you know the market
can move against you and so suddenly
like what you thought of the world as
stale and you basically want to be able
to react to that what this means is like
now this pipeline's become incredibly
latency optimized like the top relays
basically do like very very aggressive
latency optimizations this can look like
things like having Builders collocate
with relays uh which is also not good
for like vertical integration reasons
but it is what it is um and yeah then
even from there I mentioned this point
of like relay sustainability so right
now relay
well let's say when the system launched
the claim was
um essentially relays would be public
goods in the sense that they would just
perform the service uh I could think
well you know I can say the concern was
essentially that if you had a relay that
um basically could charge more than
other people then you still have the
same sort of like centralizing flywheel
that could play out so in any case I
think there's like pros or cons to both
models we have sort of this public goods
model and that's a problem because it
turns out public goods funding is really
hard and a lot of the relays I think are
quite strange right now with respect to
like sustainability so one way Rel have
thought about this is like trying to
monetize somehow and there's even like
more sophisticated ideas around I mean
we can get into if you want but
basically the way to think about it is
if I'm a relay I can look at other
relays because these are all public apis
I can look at other relays I can based
on the other relay I can uh
basically charge like the second price
across the entire auction set and then
capture the Delta and maybe share half
with the builder half of myself but then
now I have like some Revenue coming in
and there's some like sustainability
argument you can make off of
that that's going on there's also this
notion of timing games which is like uh
very concerning with respect to at
leaste the protocol and the way to think
about this is again time is money and
you kind of have like a lot of room
right now to play with when you actually
release your block to the network you
should propose at the start of your slot
uh this is like the honest Behavior but
you really have up until like this 4C
deadline uh where the rest of the Valor
set would sort of observe your block and
attest to it so there is quite a like a
lot of play here and you can be more or
less aggressive with respect to like how
much of that time you take up uh again
because you're trying to maximize profit
so that's not great but point being is
like relays I think are even thinking
about um essentially offering this as a
service where they would do all this
optimization for you and basically just
give you like the the best block they
can so yeah this was a short answer
short question with like a very long
answer they do a lot and they're doing
more over time and yeah it's quite
crazy I'll go to the next question
then after I grab some water I don't
know if there are any questions from
what I just said that was like quite a
lot
okay well thanks for the questions these
are good
so let's see
moving right some Builders have their
own Searchers or
something right what's the additional
value okay uh yeah so this is basically
a question around like exclusive order
flow I think is sort of like the buzz
phrase that you would hear about this
and yeah like the idea here is that you
know the way you should the way at least
that you know I would want this to work
is that these are all like uh
independent entities that you know maybe
are in competition in some sense because
then that drives usually better to
centralization um then from there uh
they all have like say open apis like
any of these Services these like
auctions we're talking about and things
they should be like independent like
open in some sense because then now it
like lowers the playe field or lowers
the barrier's entry to level the playe
field so it turns out though that if you
deviate from this nice ideal model you
can make more money and so this is what
we see um you know you can have I mean
like yeah sort of like a very
pathological instance you can imagine is
like I'm like a big wallet or you're
like a big telegram bot uh so I have
maybe already a lot of valuable order
flow and then from there I could even
like solid direct L to some Searcher
there's some Builder and then yeah you
end up with this like very sort of um
perhaps collusive uh arrangement in the
world and that's not great but
ultimately yeah it just turns out that
like yeah with these types of like uh
let's say agreements then yeah you can
usually make more money uh I think this
is like sort of in direct conflict with
like what we want to see out of this
part of the world but that's what we
have uh it's very hard to like prevent
these things in protocol or like with
any uh anything like that but it is an
interesting research question so if you
think about things there could be some
fancy mechanism design there could be
fancy cryptography there's there are
ways to think about this that I think
start to remove the ability or even like
desire for these sort of like back room
deals what about moving from the English
auction to the first price field auction
so
yeah I'll talk a bit about this this was
kind of what I was saying with this like
relay sustainability sort of uh
experiment that has been playing out so
the way to think about it sort of from
the beginning was that Builders would
bid uh you know hopefully the true value
of their block but even already again
these are all public endpoints so like
Builders have like sort of a PVP
mentality where they could look at other
relays to figure out what other blocks
there were and they could try to have re
uh responsive strategies and and you
know in light of that so in any case the
idea is that uh I'm a builder I like
basically say okay you know if this
block pays me X I'm going to pay like x
minus Epsilon to the proposer I keep
Epsilon for myself that's sort of like
my tip for the
service and yeah then you to have this
bid that goes into this this auction um
and this is what we mean when we say
like uh English auction yeah let me
think about this right so English
auction here is referring to the fact
that like the bids would keep going up
and I don't even know if I would say
this is an English auction actually
um if anything I think we'd call it yeah
maybe I don't understand that question
but I I think what we would call this is
a first price open auction if there are
any auction theorist you can correct me
but in any case um what I think this is
asking about is then moving from that
setting where basically you're just
bidding in the open um and the bids are
yeah just kind of they can be whatever
um but again the key point is that
whatever you bid is what you pay there
are fancier auction designs where maybe
you have a set of bids from people who
are like you know trying to like sell a
good or something and then you could
imagine doing more sophisticated things
to like score the outcome of like the
whole set of bids and this is now what
this like first price versus versus
second price is referring to where um
again there's a result in auction Theory
where if you have a set of bids sort of
like the best auction you can think of
ever having is one where everyone just
bids and what you do is you basically
charge the second
price um because that's basically like
the only thing you would have to pay if
that makes sense uh and the reason you
do this is because there's now like no
strategies around like different bidding
games you can play that become
pathological and and all this so in any
case uh we now have this thing I was
describing where uh the relays some of
the relays have exper exped with having
like um yeah different different ways to
process the bids and the idea with this
one is that okay you have a relay who
observes all their relays and let's say
like you know the highest bit from some
other relay is like X and the builder
then is bidding like X over two um let's
see how would this work it's hard to
describe out loud so you only need
the let's see
it does it go the other way so I think
then it might be the case that you have
the Builder who is going to
bid yeah I'd have to think about this to
give you a nice example but the point is
is that uh if you have a builder locally
who's overpaying then uh there's no
reason for them to overpay relative to
someone else because otherwise if they
had not bid then the next Builder would
have won and they would have paid much
less and so that's where you think get
this like rebate function yeah actually
this might
help if I can just draw this
out I think this works I just need to
scribble so
I think this will be clear so like you
can imagine there's like relay a and
relay B and so the idea then is like you
know Builder one is going to bid
X Builder two is going to bid I don't
know let's say
2X and so the idea then is
that
um right let me flip this 3x okay so the
idea then is
that if you had this set up where the
Builder here is going to pay 3x and the
Builder here was going to pay
2x if Builder one did not bid imagine
this is not here then the auction would
have been one by 2X and X I don't know I
can make these concrete numbers but say
x is just like an eth so say this is two
e and 3 e and the idea then is that you
know if you want to like draw this out
two versus three something like this if
this was not here because this was the
second highest bid then this bid would
have won the auction if this Builder was
not
here when the Builder is here they're
obviously going to win the auction but
this in some sense sets like a floor or
a ceiling depending on how you look at
it for the auction itself and so what
this means is that Builder one could
have paid 2.1 eth let's say and one
right and so that's the intuition here
is that this relay then can basically
rebate the Builder some amount here say
now there's like you know what is that
1.9 e uh that doesn't really need to be
paid to the proposer and could just be
sort of retained within the relay
Builder system and that's what this sort
of uh I don't even have like a nice name
for this but there's like a rebate
function Builder rebates is probably the
best way to describe it there's a a
builder rebate thing here where now the
Relay can say Okay rather than you
paying all of this to the proposer we
can keep some and then you know split
this up between ourselves it could be
like 50 to the relay 50% to relay 50% to
the Builder could be other things but
now you go from having absolutely no
Revenue in the relay to now having
some I think that's all I'm going to say
about that question
so yeah so yeah the the um yeah the
proposer is only interacting with one
relay meaning that um the builders don't
are not aware of what the other Builder
are um bidding uh about the other bits
meaning that we can increase the
Winner's curse and mainly for uh
integrated Builders so because we don't
really know how much are like what the
what other margins with the uh six
arbitrages uh yeah sorry what was the
question exactly I is it make sense like
to to switch to first price s auction to
uh increase uh the rewards because in
the English auction like the builders
are looking at each others and they will
just outbid at the last you know at the
end so if we are moving to a first price
SE
auction we have to suppose that there's
only one relay because I guess it
doesn't make sense to have different
auctions types between relays so we have
to be sure that there is only one relay
um if it's a good way to increase this
Windows C because I I I think that some
market makers are really want some
blocks and they are willing to pay more
that what they're actually paying at the
moment yeah it's a good question and
like I guess like the first thing to say
is there's again like even just making a
small change like this it like has like
pretty big impacts for again bidding
strategies and how everyone like shows
up to this game so things need to be
changed very
thoughtfully um I guess one thing to say
here is yeah like I I think the like key
difference that we're talking about
right now just be the fact of whether
the bids are like sealed or not so
rather basically they're private and
like one way to think about this
implementation wise is so the bids
basically from the Builder like the
blocks the Builder sends are all sealed
in this sense like other builders can't
see that from the relay assuming the
relay is acting well um but then they
expose them all to like anyone and
instead you could imagine now that the
API is like authenticated or something
in a way that only the proposer can
access them so already because of what I
just said uh you can imagine like
Builders cut deals with proposers to
like Sid step this fact like you still
need to have the relay talk to the
proposer somehow
and you could still then have a side
Channel like a proposer could be
malicious in the sense of like still
sharing like order flow somehow um you
can scope it more tightly to like just
the proposer from like this particular
slot and that helps some but there was a
concern there at least I know that's
been discussed before um another concern
is just general observability of the
system like if we do this then it's like
much harder to know like what Builders
are even bidding and like how they're
acting so right now there's actually
like pretty rich data apis that all the
relays support and because of that then
they can uh you know not they but us
everyone can actually look quite deeply
uh into what's happening and uh yeah
things like this would get in the way of
that and it might be you know good I'm
not saying necess is but it could be
it's it's just more that it's an open
question and there is like there are a
lot of like Dimensions to this yeah
question
like Network performance of
epbs uh I suppose these are happening on
the P2P layer right sending the uh
nothing right now no no not the right
now on
epbs well not even yeah so that that's a
question like I think if anything epbs
is like somewhat agnostic oh okay so
let's talk about
7732 the
IP um so that is if anything agnostic to
like how bids are
produced uh you could imagine there's a
gossip layer but the concern then is
that uh again time is money and so what
will happen is like there's some
overhead to gossip and so bids will
propagate more slowly and then because
of that Builders just won't use the
system they'll kind of you know we could
imagine they very directly go to some
more like pipe or point-to-point
Communications and this is where you
have like proposers directly connecting
to builders um again just for latency
reasons so so yeah
um the only case I would see P2P being
relevant for epbs is the case
where
um it's now like a an even lower barrier
entry for new Builders to enter the
scene and the way this would work is
that uh rather than needing to convince
a validator to connect to me directly I
can just kind of have like a almost like
open Channel where like anyone can send
bids and it's then you know you have DOS
protections and things in place but then
now you can imagine it's much easier for
like new Builders to enter the enter the
network uh then the question is like
yeah how valuable are these new players
and how does that all shake out with the
other
ones is there any evidence that the
Builder relays are
collocated um good question so
colocation refers to this fact that
um right again because of how important
Lany is here this was referring to the
fact that rather than have your Builder
like halfway around the world from the
relay like let's say there's a relay
somewhere in Europe the Builder could be
somewhere in like I don't know Tokyo uh
there's not quite like a substantial
incy between these two even on the
internet and then the question is like
yeah well if if time is so important we
could just have them right next door
like even literally like there's a
computer and then there's a computer
right below it and they're directly
connected together right that's very low
latency
so uh when we say Colo this is what we
mean that they are directly connected in
this
way um is there any evidence I think
there might have been some research that
tries to get into this
um I'm not sure if there's anything
public because I think it's kind of hard
to to assess just from
uh yeah public data I mean one way you
could maybe get about this is like you
know both Builders and relays have apis
EXP exposed and you could maybe just
like Ping them directly and try to like
geolocate them in a sense yeah
pus exactly which servers they are they
have two different servers from two
different continents and they are
collated and they are under
one but relays or Builders like I don't
know I
think they build are cating with them
and the communications today is under
one MC
there's a bit more to that because
obviously the relay wants to be close to
the proposer so if the relay's closer to
the proposer you can delay things a
little bit more as well so what the Rel
wants to do is to be in lots of
locations that are close to proposers
and the reality is that they want to be
close the
Li and and other validators but yeah I
mean I have seen relay designs where
they have this like Geo distribution
baked in just again to reduce Laten Z to
to validators
do relays get paid for doing their task
if no what are the advantages for
someone to run a relay I'm also going to
see how we are on time okay about 30
minutes so do Rel get paid for their
task if no what are the advantages for
someone to run a relay if yes do block
Builders pay them and
how uh the short answer is no other than
again I think the most like public thing
we've seen is just uh this like um
Builder rebate mechanism I was trying to
describe
and otherwise were the advantages yeah I
mean I think the initial idea was you
know there are altruistic actors in the
space who care about ethereum and want
to like provide this as almost like a
public good and so that's what they do
um there have been a number of like
funding efforts in the space like PBS
Foundation is one uh that tries to like
help the situation and like provide at
least some like tools for
sustainability and yeah otherwise do
block Builders pay them yeah so um yeah
I'm trying to avoid getting into
to maybe sensitive things but ultimately
let's yeah let's just say you you might
imagine that Builders are paying four
things uh for special treatment which if
anything motivates epbs right because
you know we talked about this with the
Searchers a second ago like you guys you
know we aren't dumb like we can imagine
that there are like things happening uh
with these actors and if anything like
the way we remove that is by sort of
enforcing more things in the protocol
either with like cryptography code
economics all of our usual tools uh and
that really does motivate Solutions like
you know different players of
epbs uh trust assumptions okay what are
the trust assumptions between Builders
and Searchers yeah so this is an
interesting question maybe I will say
just a little bit about Searchers
because I think I just threw the term
out
[Music]
um there is this Vision that there is
like a actually well okay I have some
slides for this but it's not a big deal
so ultimately um there was this Vision
that you would have again the like many
actors and a very like diverse setup for
this transaction supply chain which is
basically saying like Okay uh these days
we think about intents so you can
imagine I even have an intent you know I
like want some meme coins and then I
just like yell this at someone on the
internet and then it somehow turns into
like a final transaction on some
blockchain and then we ask how does it
go from like you know the thought in my
head to uh actually landing on some
chain like a concrete State transition
in one of these systems so uh there's
like a lot of ways to think about this
and again like I said a bit ago like
every day there's like some new actor
entity that like kind of shows up to the
table but you could imagine that uh sort
of simplified model that's helpful to
think about is that there's you know
myself as a user making a transaction
for that I like use either an
application or like a wallet they then
would make a transaction that goes into
say them impol from there could have
these like specialized entities called
Searchers uh who then are looking at
them in pool and these are the ones now
that know these like very sophisticated
strategies for MV extraction uh like a
typical one to think about is like
sandwiching where basically if I have a
lot of slippage on like a trade I want
to make on some decks which is basically
referring to like my uh tolerance let's
say for like execution meaning um I
would accept a worse price or maybe a
better price than like what I exactly
think I'm getting
and in any case um Searchers then can
basically work around this slippage and
kind of take out the bits that uh you
left on the table in terms of having
this flexibility of your trade against
say what's on chain because then as you
realize there's like markets that are
moving other places in the world the
chain then like follows them eventually
and point being is there are ways to
distract me Searchers are the entity
that would do this
now then if you have a bunch of
Searchers in the world they might want
to specialize exactly in these like very
sophisticated strategies they might not
be the best at like building blocks
themselves because they are kind of
separate task where a builder might have
like a bunch of uh usually like bundles
of transactions from Searchers they
would then uh put them all into like a
block that's valid with respect to the
protocol and then the builder then would
work with proposers via
PBS okay so that was longwinded but
ultimately uh there's notion of Searcher
and if
anything what we've probably seen evolve
over the years that is not good but
we've essentially seen like vertical
integration and kind of the dissolution
of these different roles um you know in
the limit like we're talking so much
about why latency is so bad like you
could imagine they're like okay well why
even why even have a builder separate
from a relay right like they could just
be the same thing and if anything that
also gets to like this col location
question like this is exactly what
happens so I think similarly you see
various arrangements with search and
Builders uh there is a lot of research I
know that has gone into this question if
you just search like probably like yeah
Builder Searcher vertical integration or
something uh you'll find plenty of
research there but ultimately yeah um in
an ideal world you could imagine that it
would make sense to have them be
separate entities at separate parts of
this transaction supply chain and they
might be mutually distrustful um and in
that case yeah then you need to think
about like okay how do I make sure that
it's really the same set of problems
again just between Builder and Searcher
like how do I make sure that the Builder
is not going to like either search
themselves against my orderflow they're
going to like you know if I have a
bundle of transactions that pays me as a
Searcher some amount I want to make sure
the Builder doesn't like um mess with
that in any way and like respects the
you know one way to think about this is
it is like sensitive data in this
context and so like you just have to be
careful who who you share things
with
and yeah point being is I think in
practice you see like all sorts of trust
assumptions all the way from like I'm a
builder and you can just send me flow
and you know ultimately it's sort of a
just trust me bro Arrangement and if
anything that means then that like
you're relying on reputation of the
Builder uh because you know where does
get
around uh otherwise yeah I think you
even see things on the other end of the
spectrum where like Builders basically
are searching themselves uh and being
like very active players uh Beyond just
like constructing
blocks so yeah there's so it's a
it's a rabbit hole in
itself um let's see are there any other
questions I think okay we still have
some time um there's one here so what
are your thoughts on 7732 do you think
it will be
implemented okay so 7732 is the CIP I
was talking about earlier that's like a
particular construction of a flavor of
epbs uh there are other types of flavors
of vpbs you might have heard of like APS
which is like a a tester proposer
separation and you know I think there's
been more thoughts since even like the
earlier PBS days around like how we
might want this to actually look in the
protocol and because of that uh well
yeah basically because of that there are
different ideas um and yeah so I don't
think it's like super settled that like
this is the right uh or like the only
direction to go in that being said uh
there is in this in this sort of bucket
of things of having this like PTC the
payload tness committee that called out
way at the beginning of my slides uh
there has I think been the most work on
like formally specifying uh this design
and it has gotten to us gotten us to the
place of an EIP
7732 and yeah so do I think it will be
implemented well it already has been uh
pus is back there and has been working
on it quite a bit so maybe talk to him
after uh if you if you want to hear more
about that um but ultimately yeah so
like there is an EIP which is you know a
very big step very exciting to see
and yeah I mean there's a number of
things in there um maybe the question is
asking like if I think it'll be you know
implemented or included on Main net and
yeah I mean with 7732 in particular like
I think it does start to like if
anything it iterates us towards these
like maybe more even more
forward-looking designs around like APS
you might have heard of like execution
auctions or execution tickets again
there's like a whole research zoo of
things there but ultimately um yeah so
that's something nice about it is that
it sort of sets us up to start moving in
that direction with respect to the
protocol um another nice thing that I
like this is like kind of zooming in
just one part of it but it essentially
adds this notion of like pipelining to
the protocol that uh actually makes a
lot of things more resilient um right
now sort of the execution layer and the
consist layer are coupled together uh in
a way and uh what this means is for
example if relays go offline uh they
can't essentially complete the auction
exchange and then there's no there's no
block for that slot this is bad and one
nice thing with 7732 is it does add this
like pipelining which uncouples the
execution in the consensus layer blocks
uh so you'd at least be like somewhat
tolerant to this fault with relays which
would be
nice um what else about
7732 yeah I mean again I think pus and I
could have a bit of a conversation about
this but I'm not as convinced that it
will necessarily get rid of the relays
today I do think think it will like
lower barriers entry and we might see
new actors enter the market uh which is
very good but yeah I think given all
these like latency concerns and just
like entrench info that we have today
it's like not as clear that even if we
have something in the protocol it's
going to necessarily uh you know get rid
of or move people away from using the
relays they're using
today
question sure um yeah I'm just wondering
if you have any insight on to like uh if
there's been any changes on like how
daps or uh let's say intent networks or
other application applications are like
sending their transactions to builders
and like having their transactions show
up on chain like are are uh you know
exchanges just still sending all of
their transactions to like the men pool
or do they do orderful auctions or there
like other um ways that like daps are
evolving and like sending transactions
to
builders yeah I mean I think it's all
the above and it's like hard to say just
because again there's like new ideas
people come up with every day so like
it's hard to keep track of it all um you
know even one thing recently has been
like 4337 and this notion of like
bundlers and so now there's like you
know you can imagine this whole sort of
pipeline is now not just for
transactions but also for like user Ops
and it just kind of like broadens the
scope of everything um then yeah lately
then we've seen like the rise of like
intense and solvers and like again just
like either a prefix or even like
another way to think about like getting
into actual like State transitions on
chain uh which is like quite
interesting and yeah I think maybe you
touched a bit or like we're pointing at
this notion of like private order flow
so like this is something I think we've
seen like a pretty huge growth of um I
should have numbers I don't have exact
numbers on the latest data but basically
yeah there's been like very much a rise
in private order flow meaning like
transactions that never touch the public
pole um and you know if you play this
out one way you could think about it is
that we actually get to a place where
like there is
no use for like the public men pool
which is like very bad for like CR type
things sship resistance but it could be
the case that and yeah so I don't think
we'll get to a place where there's like
no one using the M Pool but you could
get to a case where like 90% of
transactions just basically use other
methods um and if anything the the mol
serves as like a sort of inclusion
pathway of Last Resort say for like
censorship
resistance um and a little followup uh
I'm just kind of curious like how do uh
solvers on like in temp net works like
cow swap or socket or whatever um like
do they when they're like creating
blocks or partial blocks like are they
sending them directly to builders or
they send them to Searchers or like
where like where where do those intents
go like from uh like in various intent
networks yeah I think it depends and
like even when we say intent networks I
think there's ideas around like even
having things that look like rollups or
like other blockchains that are like
providing some like infrastructure for
intense uh but even without thinking
about like something like that uh you
could just have like you know a bunch of
s solvers who are like say like coww for
example is a good idea or a good example
where uh they're taking in things that
look like intense they do some work to
figure out how to like make the best
blocks uh and then yeah
like yeah I mean they would all
literally go to builders today I
mean yeah they don't have to but it
would be a huge lift for uh well no I
mean they really do have to because
otherwise you would just gossip like
let's say you have let's like take C
swap as an example and you like
uh have this nice like C swap partial
block or like you know say it becomes a
full block you can't put this in the
public men pole because then like
someone could just steal it right um so
yeah they really do rely on these like
PBS
Pathways um
yeah thank you that's really
helpful okay I don't see any other
questions and I've been talking for a
while okay pus has a question
yeah I'm curious what are your thoughts
on uh things that are off protocol today
and that they're not uh Envision to be
on protocol like uh prec confirmations
and and prec confirmation for L1 prec
confirmation for L2 and that we the the
whole Builder system is like building
towards that and I wonder if uh if we
act late we might lose the chance of
implementing the endgame auction either
execution tickets or execution auctions
or whatever research come comes up if we
late yeah I don't think it'll ever be
too late like I don't know if it is too
late then I would say it's also too late
even with like PBS today and 7732 for
example and like I just don't really
believe at least I don't know I would
hope that that's not the case um but
it's a good point yeah it could be the
case that we do have offchain systems
that basically get so entrenched it's
like very hard to even you know yes we
can change the protocol or like we can
you know as a community change the
protocol but then the question is like
uh would it matter right and it's just
like being sensitive to the fact that
like you know history is real we we live
in a world and uh yeah this is
definitely part of the consideration
when thinking about different priorities
around like Research into different
topics uh and things like this so you
mentioned pre- confirmations uh this is
a very interesting one um yeah maybe
just like a quick tear for the crowd if
you don't know what this is the idea is
that basically um like if you go to use
a L2 today you basically are working
directly with like a centralized
sequencer and so you know you're like
hey I want to make this trade on you
know this Unis swap pool on whatever L2
they can basically immediately say yes
uh you're good to go you're at this part
in the block and tell you that
immediately rather than waiting for the
entire L2 block to be ready to be
produced and that's more like what it
looks like on L1 so pre-com here
basically are a way to think about this
like ux or this set of features at L1 um
and there's been some designs there's
like a number of like pre-confirmation
teams that are working on this to like
add this this D
one to be honest like yeah I guess I
have mixed feelings because like most of
the designs I've seen are basically just
copying a lot of this like uh they have
different labels but one way to think
about this is having like uh this
Builder relay proposer architecture but
then there's just like different
functions they perform in the pre-com
context the problem here is that this is
all very like very much centralized
right like um you would hope to have
like a
yeah if anything you start to
decentralize like the relay or the
Builder in this context and with pre-
comps they call this like a Gateway that
you can think of as like a relay um yeah
I don't I don't love it uh people are
building it ethereum is a permissionless
system so it is what it is the claim is
that we will eventually sort of do this
like Progressive decentralization over
time so it's not that it's like you know
this terrible thing that's just going to
happen uh but definitely I think it's
something to keep an eye on and be very
uh yeah just be very mindful of
hi uh thank you for doing this um maybe
a more specific question so looking back
like one year and how uh blocks have
been constructed back then uh the
proposal payment was usually the last
transaction in the block and now looking
over the last year especially with Titan
Builder growing uh we saw a change in
pattern there where now they like send
in like a bunch of uh internal
transactions to combine this payment um
do you have any idea why they do this
and is this something why they're so
successful and the second part is do we
actually have like a spec of what's what
what kind of things can be included to
pay the proposer could it be in the next
block or whatever like uh do we have
that uh yeah these are good questions um
so the first question is yeah like the
way that uh at least the implementation
started with this whole thing was that
they expect they they were basically
expecting the last transaction in the
block to pay the
proposer and uh yeah but there are other
ways you can think about paying the
proposer as a builder uh and we've seen
some of them crop up over time so you
know one way that I know people like is
actually just uh having the proposer be
the fee recipient in the block because
you can just call the coinbase off code
and then pay
coinbase and yeah there's a number of
reasons to do this one of them is it's
actually just cheaper like the coinbase
off code to load and then pay and then
yeah I mean I guess we should double
check this but I I would imagine that
like you know coinbase in the evm call
in the evm is going to be cheaper than
this like uh having a whole other
transaction so it's basically a way to
just have like uh yeah more efficient
payments um you could also then imagine
you have other arrangements maybe with
Searchers or different things where you
might want a little more flexibility
than just this like one fixed
transaction
um so yeah there's a lot of reasons to
do it and yeah there's a number of ways
to structure it in terms of like a spec
uh there is one actually uh I believe
let's see I think it was just like the
last hard Fork uh this question came up
in the context of withdrawals you can
imagine then that if I'm a proposer so
part of the the relay working here is
that they get blocks from Builders they
work with the one proposer to sort of
have this auction happen uh part of this
R is like verifying the payment is made
correctly to the proposer there's an
issue though because now we have this
notion of
withdrawals uh you know out of the cons
layer into the execution layer and that
was causing some problems with
implementations because they just didn't
really have logic to account for
withdraws and it would lead to like
weird reporting there's like Twitter
Bots and things that would like flag
High m blocks and it would lead to like
weird
things um so in any case uh yeah uh I
worked with people on like a spec for
exactly this uh I think well okay I
might have lost slide
ability which is okay but anyway um in
any case uh there's like a GitHub repo
so GitHub ethereum Builder specs like
Builder Das specs and there's
essentially like payment schemes
specified there so right now I believe
it's just the like last transaction and
then the coinbase route if there's
others that should be there uh let me
know um if anything the idea is like
this specifies like honest behavior and
so like
uh one like very popular and sort of
like foundational implementation of the
relay right now is like under the flash
Bots org and so uh yeah like their relay
follows the spec and you know we could
add things but it's should be a bit of a
conversation before just like adding a
bunch of wild
stuff um does that I think that answered
your questions yeah
cool okay I think we have have few more
minutes but if there are no questions