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so hi everyone so today we're going to
speak about arbitration of contract and
the centralized quote so first let's
start with a simple example
you have Alice and Bob who met on the
financing platform and they agreed that
Bob will make a website for Alice
against free user and a leased space Bob
but Bob give a shitty website and Alice
is not happy and wants her money back
but since there is no charge back with
scripto she has no recourse so to avoid
that she could put money in a small
contract if she gets a website great she
sign and the contract baseball but in
case we dispute Bob say no I've made
website if you want something better
you'll have to pay extra and both things
that are right so they pay arbitration
fees the dispute goes to an arbitrator
and I will trade rock'n'roll which we
trigger the previous mail contract which
will move the phones the first catch is
all cool the arbitrator know what the
smart contract was referring about so to
solve that the first when they created
the contract input the ash of the plain
English contract and this way when the
dispute they can show to the arbitrator
what was the contract agreed in plain
English and if there is no dispute its
privacy-preserving and I want us to ever
know about what the contract was
actually we can even do better imagine
we have a contract with four pages pages
one and two are on one topic which is
three and four on another one and you
don't want to reveal both of the topic
of the contract if you only have one
topic which is imported
and for arbitration so use a local tree
and you just have to read all the pages
which are linked to what you are
disputing and the thing is that the
arbitrator can be everything it can be a
centralized party a multi seed or even
it down and that's what clearance is I'm
given an example which is very simple
which is used transfer money but in
practice we can have way more complex
way more complex dispute an enforcement
as long as it's enforceable by a smart
contract so with money with freelancing
ecommerce crowdfunding you will have you
have autos ico the raise money but if
the token buyer and not appease I have
no way to get the money back so we will
have my stone and when my son is reached
you unlock the money and if the token
order and the team don't agree that's a
dispute online gaming cheating social
network you submit content which is
against the shot you have a dispute you
lose you remove the content and you
penalize the party were rewriting the
rules in typical property we've seen a
nice example in the Def Con with ENS you
have someone registering your trademark
well you go to Vienna system to have
blacklist you have a dispute to dispute
is okay this is my trademark I don't
want you to use this ENS and I want it
to be blacklisted and the result of the
arbitral contract is a blacklist of the
domain if the one claiming the
intellectual property is a sin as
correct by the arbitrator or insurance
this event occurred and does the insurer
have to pay so we can abstract that and
have to kind of contract arbitrator
smart contract which are responsible for
enforcement of ruling and arbitrators
which are responsible for giving the
ruling and the goal is to have every
Abbot reverse my contract I'll be
troubled by every arbitrator contract so
this way if you
developer you can easily switch from one
arbitrator to another so let's go back
to kleros the idea of kleros is 12
courtesan jurors so first we could say
okay we let everyone adjuster and
everyone in Tudor oh well that would be
quite impractical because you will
either need to pay everyone arbitration
fee or everyone will get peanuts so in
both way we have an issue so we can just
roll some of them which will look at
evidence and vote and get a relation fee
but not all but there is still a problem
since we don't have a way to be sure
that someone I just won online on chain
identity someone like this guy will
register tons of time and be almost the
only one drawn to solve that instead of
during jurors which were tokens so you
activate you token prohibition we get to
random number with one of the metal I
talked about yesterday from this one we
can get multiple ones everyone was a
token Ron is an arbitrator so we had the
incentive to arbitrate which is get the
attrition fee but now we need an
incentive to arbitrate correctly and
honestly but unfortunately we can't
really move your honestly in an
algorithmic manner we could say okay
it's another dispute this arbitrator
rule honestly or not but some kind of
chicken and egg problem so the best
thing we can have is currents as a proxy
of honesty so in this example you can
ask you a new audio the vault sheet for
Bob
why isn't majority but it for Alice so
Zeus Jareau say we lose part of the
token to the draw watch it currently
that's inspired by game game theory and
shading point and this buddy example if
you vote the same way as user you win
something otherwise you lose something
and if we remove all the latter we can
see a matrix
which is symmetric and from a
mathematical standpoint there is no
reason to vote for Bob or for Alice both
of them could be seen at the same but
fortunately we are labeled and in the
absence of other factors we have some
solution which can emerge which we call
the the focal point and in this case the
focal point has to be honesty so why
would you vote honestly because you
think that the author will vote honestly
or perhaps because you think that the
other thing that's all the think that
the read what honestly in practice it
goes up to three level and that's all we
can get honest weddings they receive
some attacks one could be okay I bought
before everyone else I bought Bob no
both of the other parties as I know that
you exhibit Bob's the acquirement so
even if bob is not the honest answer the
cool bad Bob so ought to avoid that is
to use committin Villa so instead of
voting directly you generate your number
or wand on one locally and you commit
the ash of this number and you vote and
in the second phase you will reverse the
number your vote and on chain we can
verify that it was effectively
corresponding to ash is submitted you
could say okay I'm gonna review my
number and my vote was a party twin free
enzyme so to avoid that we have to
penalize this behavior so if someone
weevil the number and the vote another
party this party can show that on Shane
invalidate the world and still part of
the coins so this way you can't
influence other trust ously you can
either say okay I'm gonna vote for Bob
but I don't prove it I don't show you I
could be lying or you can say okay I'm
gonna vote for Bob I show you the proof
but now you have the right to see my
coin and in village my vote so it not
trust last one way or the other
another attack pragmatic will be bribing
and it's particularly problematic with
box and smart contract because you can
make bribing
which are trustless which will
automatically pay the bribe withdraw
vote the way you you asked so to avoid
that you need to have an appeal system
so if someone managed to bribe Jarreau
at some level she was the party can
appear and get more and more jurors and
if you are in zone as majority
assumption it will be highly more
expensive for the dishonest party
because most of the and most of the
round he will lose and even in the round
you will win you will also have to pay
bribe where is the different we just
have to pay a peer fees so that gives a
huge advantage to the defender another
problem which can arise is okay i press
i don't like freelancing dispute I don't
want to arbitrate zhuzh I want win which
wait insurance so for that we need an
arbor essence of course which are
increasingly and increasingly
specialized so when you register to be a
draw you don't reach to the quote you
lose a pass to unquote so for chief it's
a general ecommerce and financing so we
can be drawn in all of these but we can
ask ok or do we make Auto quote if you
were to let everyone make support that
will rapidly and in a mass of support
with no clearance so that's why we need
governance and we've seen previous
governance system like the Dow that we
have a huge problem which is most of the
token order they just don't vote so how
can we count the vote of people who
don't want to vote that source will
liquid voting so look at voting either
you vote and everything works as if it
was in direct voting or if you don't and
you've designed before a new chosen
before an adviser you vote the same way
as will adviser and it is adviser as an
vote but also as an adviser you
odd as ways advisor of advice or vote
and in can't go to the point that you
have one party with effectively voting
and now we we've seen the website
dispute and we see we have done the
website dispute so why not make a quote
especially Kelly fossils we can also
have some other kind of problem which is
its arbitration it's not just right or
wrong that could be the case for Oracle
if it's something with the president
yeah you either lied or you tell the
truth that's easy
but for for dispute it can be more shady
so where do we draw the line if you just
let your vote like that some juror would
vote honestly but we still consider as
increment so we lose token will be
frustrated so to reduce this problem
we'll have policies a policy is
something which look like a law it's
basically a guideline of Oh to arbitrate
one example of policy will be if you
sense
sell some good and you sell it at
distance and it's worth more than one
issue and you don't use track shipment
and buy a claim he has not receive it we
assume that the buyer has not receive it
so the one issue some parcels I know we
could do that follows your point one one
four ten and it may not be consensual
between the juror so for them to know
all the should rule should have
guideline which can be bought through
governance another problem is the 51%
attack
what if someone buys more than half of
the coin and keep forgiving the nice
rolling accepting bribe that will pose a
huge problem that's also why we need
some specific coin because buying half
of the coin of Cairo's
would be way more expensive as buying
half of the issue which will be used in
trials because of market death
if you want to buy alpha of the coin of
a one coin type you don't just have to
pay for alpha of the market cap because
okay the first seller you pay the market
price but you rapidly run out of seller
at market price as the price increases
so perhaps even with a value which is
higher than the market cap you might not
even be able to buy alpha Xu's moreover
if you wise whose coin you do some
attack and you accept bribe you're
dishonest well you end up with a design
escort and we want is dispute to be
arbitrated by your design escort no one
so your token will rapidly become
worthless you can fall hit even and make
another quote with only honest party but
even in that they receive a catch which
is a contract which were created before
they don't know the cool become is
dishonest they don't know that they have
to update to a new quote and a new token
and they will still be under the
arbitration of the dishonest code but
one could argue that it's the same with
ischium and connected object
Dakshina where if someone buy our fuzzy
sir and she Trump's an attack
all these you object relying on
blockchain they don't know there is an
attack and they will sit behave the way
the attack chain is behaving and in the
first type I've shown you some really
simplified version of what the incentive
could look like but in practice it's way
more complicated so you have some part
which is a token or distribution voting
the same way as the other we also have
the honesty of the decision because if
the quote given a decision your tokens
autocannons quote and unicode is
variable so the value of you two can
increase a bit and it's a cool givenness
ruling your value
decrease abit and since you're talking a
lot during treated cases you have no way
to sell them before when we listen to
catch into all the sense which is
not a computer you can't just like get
evidence process them in one microsecond
and give a ruling
it actually takes times you have to look
at a paper wall cut images at argument
of parties yeah time is money so it has
a cost for you so you could you say okay
you know that's may not be worth it I
will just watch randomly to get the fees
so depending to the value of all this
variable in the incentives we can have
multiple multiple point where party
could always vote this way and each one
will be as current as the other but some
would lead to his own escort some will
lead to honest one and some will lead to
quote just giving random results so what
we call juice its Nash equilibrium
it's a Nash equilibrium when everyone
strategy is in such a way that after
everyone knows everyone a strategy no
one regret is own strategy and changing
from one strategy to another does not
have lot of sense if you don't think
that the other party also gonna change
your strategy so that's why it's really
important that at the beginning the
quote even s ruling because this way no
one would have an interest in changing
just for him
strategy to a dishonest one so oh can we
verify that's twelve so can be recited
by that it's with experimental crypto
economies so at the beginning you don't
link that to real contract which we are
smack attack investment but you still
have general and cielab incentive in
term of token redistribution
you take a set of dispute that you know
already solved but that you don't really
draw and you look at what the result
will be compared to what you call your
own growing truth which is a the result
of the dispute you had before
and you can use metrics which are
inspired by machine learning to evaluate
all the ruling of the court is actually
rated to the ruling of your booing truth
so basically you do machine learning as
with humans classifier so thanks
everyone for listening if you want you
can contribute we have a basic version
of the code some arbitrary smart
contract you can interact with contract
and test net and we are still building
the web suite interface to actually use
in a nice and user-friendly manner
thanks
you
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