I'd like to start off with introductions
so my name is Eva as mentioned I work on
various projects in the etherium
ecosystem and super close with GFI and
maybe if you guys can start and say what
you're working on and how that relates
to stable coins sure so I'm Victor
Rourke that I work with the our dive
project and for those of you that are
familiar it's an open source non-profit
money lego protocol that's created by
Francesco Renzi and me Alistair Chang
earlier this summer it's sort of one
sentence pitches programmable interest
payments it takes dye as the underlying
asset and invests in no loss lending
pools like compound dy/dx our fulcrum
and then takes that interest that's
streaming back to the user account and
allows the user that holds the die to
direct that interest outside of their
own account so you can use it to pay for
services you can direct it to charities
open source projects and for me it kind
of constituted a my third fall down the
rabbit hole in in crypto so the first
one is the one everybody talks about
when you first understand Bitcoin and
come out the other end and you start
saying things like fiat money instead of
dollar bills and then my second trip
down the rabbit hole is learning about
maker Dow understanding how those kinds
of systems which seem incredibly complex
can result in this really wonderful
system that that opens up all kinds of
new affordances for human financial
behavior and then the money Legos that
are built on top of it are fascinating
and so when I when I heard about our die
I started building on it and I
recognized that it's not only a cool
money Lego but it actually kind of hurts
a cognitive bias that are sort of
circumnavigates a cognitive bias that
we've always had whenever we pay for
things out of pocket which is lost
version doesn't feel good to see your
number go down and your bang
and so anything you pay for you have to
overcome that obstacle so our die when
you can direct interest to things that
you support it seems to alleviate some
of that loss aversion that it thinks and
you know kind of gets me spinning
thinking about the different
possibilities that you can build out a
payment system and a payment network
that is an entirely different structure
with a lot more fluidity and a lot more
possibility for supporting things that
we think of now as these kinds of you
need to add support models or
surveillance capitalism the support but
with the directed interest micropayment
kind of platform like our die you really
do have some really neat models that
come out of that so excited to build
it's not on main men yet but that'll be
a couple of months away so I encourage
everybody to check it out hopefully you
make me fall down the same rabbit hole I
did yeah rune Kristensen CEO of the mega
foundation and for those of you that
didn't hear it yesterday we just
announced that full version of die x
that also includes the die savings rate
is launching of the memory team I'm Dan
Robinson I'm a research partner paradigm
which is a crypto asset investment firm
but I'm here representing my own views
and not those are the fun I mostly work
on to the research and the currency and
defy and recently published a paper
called the yield protocol which is about
a way to do essentially secured zero
coupon bonds on ethereum so for example
one wide eye is where it is the demon
bull for one die at a particular future
date and is secured by some to youth
collateral so unlike unlike I die I'm
like unlike it's it's not a petrol and
it's also not meant to target stability
so it's a way to get to rehab to the the
wide I traded some discount and you can
infer from the discount what the implied
interest rate is that the market sets on
this particular maturity of debt and so
it's it's a protocol essentially for
interest rate discovery on it there
awesome so something that's been really
exciting that came out of this world of
dye that makers created is all these
derivatives like our dye Ellis died she
died but a lot of that has to do with
the interest rate that people can earn
right so these opportunities that for
example hence adapt is creating
arbitrage between a maker CDP and
lending a compound but how do you guys
see interest rates evolving as our
ecosystem involves and maybe Dan will
start with you given Y tokens are a
little bit relevant
sure yes and so wider exam obviously
hasn't been implemented yet but once you
do just from sort of the market on chain
you can get what the markets just for
the prices of various maturities you can
infer what the market predicts the term
structure of interest rates will be
which is the two-threes of the future
path of interest rates I think if you
did that now and this is a very sort of
unjustified opinion I think it would be
an inverted yield curve in that I think
people think that the current yields are
gonna go down in the future that would
be that would be probably my guess maybe
I'm not sure if the other panel if it is
gray yeah I mean I I really have no
action we talked about it yesterday like
I really have no idea what the yield
curve would look like if there is one
and also I think it would be really
difficult to even construct one right
because we need to have a lot more
liquidity in ecosystem and maybe what we
do get to that level of liquidity that
you know the economy has stabilized a
little bit
and who knows it'll still be inverted
though I actually agree with you right
now that rates do seem to be going down
and and so to the question of like these
yields are critical for for all of these
like derivative essence what I think is
really interesting is that with what the
dye savings rate is going to add now
this would be the first time a defy that
you can get a type of yield that doesn't
add any additional risk to the
underlying stable point and and yeah and
I think that will really allow for even
more types of of innovation like this or
at least it'll make people feel a lot
more safe doing it because for instance
if you wanted to use something like our
die and donate it to charity if you're
using compound right
you actually alike like you're not just
donating money to charity for free
because you are taking some risk and
there are some real nuns your risk that
you could you could end up with a loss
because of compound having like a you
know nothing you could cover liquidation
and that's where the die savings rate is
it's really interesting embedded you
know there really is no downside to to
like sending it out so it really is like
free money in a way that you can also
give away and really have no sense of no
no possibility of a loss so yeah also I
this is not the boxing match part of the
panel this is not me really fighting
with each other I agree that the rates
are artificially high now because of all
kinds of sort of one time or you know
system issues with the platform risk
it's more contract risk with compound
being on the level and the fact that
died savings rates coming out I think
we're gonna see a massive kind of
paroxysm those kinds of rates and things
will stabilize in number of months if
not years but I don't think that this is
sustainable at the current levels but I
think that there still is a very high
probability that these defy technologies
will enable you know some sort of above
inflation type interest rates that uh
that could be quite useful for going to
the protocols awesome yeah I think
something that's cool and it sort of the
elephant in the room is that the makers
stability fee almost acts like a LIBOR
today and so people started debating you
know how is the compound lending
interest rate dictated and really that's
probably a new proxy to what makers
stability fees today maybe when you can
speak a little more to how the DSR will
be decided and how the stability fee has
also been decided lately just for those
in the room who aren't aware that
process yes so right so the maker
stability fee is what you have to pay
right now in order to generate die by
putting a collateral into to maker and
it started out at a half percent when
they launched two years ago and it
stayed stable at a half percent for like
I think almost a year like very clearly
in very in that state
very low rate for almost a year and then
suddenly last spring it just like shut
up and became like hit a high point of
twenty and a half percent of it and the
reason why it changes at all it's
because it's actually cooler so it's
empty our was it's a governance of maker
that decides what disability is and they
have like this weekly decision-making
process that sets a new one every week
but that decision is made entirely based
on data on the price of died in the
market because what you use rates for is
you really use that to stabilize the
died estate upon itself and make it as
stable against the US dollar as possible
and this is actually analogous to how
central bank's that that manage affect
currency they have to always modify
their rates so that they can keep their
pigs and it's a really the very basic
logic is that if you're currently if you
want your currency to go up in value you
have to increase the rates in maker what
happened was that around spring this
year the diaper I suddenly fell below
like filter like 96 cents or something
and what was happening is too many
people were taking advantage of the fact
that they could borrow divert cheaply
and then sell it more Eve and then dead
like better exposure to eat so the
response of the government was to then
just increase the rate until peeps
double stop borrowing that much dye
right and so basically like the supply
was going up too much demand was only
like staying at this level I guess you
could say rather than the high rates
like push the supply back down to be in
line with demand so the price could
remain stable so and what's happening
now is the rates are going back down and
that's basically actually I think
because of this new dimension of dye
demand where people buy dyes and they
can put into compound into like these
derivative by type of products and then
itself is then dragging the rates down
and I think that really shows to hold
the nature of the feedback loop they're
like as there's more demand for CDP's
the more amenable for borrowing because
the rate is so low the raid on Amanda
goes
and now there's all this demand for
compound and like for all of these ways
to earn an it like a return on your on
your on your own stable points and
they're those rates then go down and I
think once we get into the I savings
rate and once the ego system matures a
bit more we might finally get to a point
where the rates in general start being a
bit more stabilized because I think
really the whole journey we've been
through like this extremely high like
extremely low raise to extremely high
rates and then coming back down that is
like exactly what you would expect from
like a brand new economy right like it
doesn't really people kind of like
making having the wrong assumptions
sometimes like trying to extrapolating
the wrong things and over time as the
market goes through this like a learning
process I think she's stabilized a lot
more agreed I think that some of the
factors that dictate that our eath price
maker decision making and then also
organic demand for dye that will dictate
these interest rates but dan in your
protocol like what variables were you
taking into account when you were
building your yields group sure yeah so
spending those panel with stable coins
because basically that the defining
feature in the useful feature about wide
perkins is that they're not stable so
Meeker you know through a really really
sort of ingenious mechanisms I managed
to achieve these two things perpetuity
and stability that are really necessary
to have a $1 in change and I'm buttering
up now because I think we're gonna we're
gonna come close a little more later on
an attack I I think what wide open does
is just just abandons us says this is no
longer perpetual it's and we're not
gonna talk its ability but as a result
you actually get quite by removing these
four these parameters from from the
system and just letting the price quote
freely you actually at the market to
tell you what it thinks the interest
rate is for this particular tenor and I
think that's that's useful it's useful
potentially as an input into systems
like maker compound to help inform their
formulas or governess decisions and
Italy usually somebody looking for a
fixed term loan for the amount of time
but but ultimately no depends I think on
this kind of rock-solid unit of account
look died I was becoming interesting I
feel like this is the time that we
should switch gears so the hot topic is
multi collateral die and so figuring out
what is the process and what will be
included and maybe ruin if you have any
context you can provide about what we
know of how the process is gonna be
bootstrapped that might be useful yeah
so maker maker governance is notoriously
complex because we're really talking
about like governance aware of a full
monetary system so we have this
extremely dedicated core community that
actually spent the time it takes to like
you know follow all the sort of the the
most detailed research and actually even
creating research themselves so there is
actually a very well liked thought out
like like base level theory around the
whole the whole concept of how we're
gonna do make your governments and
multilateral die
that has been worked on for years at
this point and the foundation has then
like contributed a lot to this
conversation of selves and then
ultimately also to seem like the organic
conversation coming out of the community
and all the ideas and then like
formulated a very basic you know what
we're calling an interim kind of like
just like an initial framework that's
that should work for the very early
stages right and and we really just
extrapolating what's already there which
is the this weekly cycle that sets the
rates in your system and then creating a
new monthly cycle because it's more it
deals with nothing more advanced so it's
going to be on a monthly basis and
actually in addition to the already
existing weekly cycle that will continue
to exist and that's how the rates will
continue to be set in some of the in the
short term but then in this every
monthly cycle you have this like end to
end process of like evaluating new
collateral tokens and also evaluate
existing collateral tools seeing whether
you want to unfold new collateral and
and also how you want to
the parameters for existing collateral
types and the goal is always to try to
get as much like as broad discussion
it's kind of I guess as rational and and
as little as possible of kind of like a
popularity contest so we actually try to
in a way like actively prevent NPI
holders from having too much influence
at the granular level so it's just like
you know whoever whatever an NPI will
like whatever random coin that they like
gets like the special treatment right
but instead having it all focused on
like always getting a hold of data and
then applying like models that have
already been agreed on and then through
that coming to like this this common
understanding of how we can securely
include new collateral types right so
essentially there's two facets to how
you're deciding multi collateral die one
is the degree of collateral summing
victor sedums interesting is having
different types of eath like ethos the
collateral but different collateral
rates and also the asset and so the
fundamental question is should we be
including trusted assets in multi
collateral die and I know there's a bit
there's a bit of controversy so maybe
we'll start with Dan on your perspective
on that sure yeah so I think as you said
you know major governance is extremely
complex process and right now it's as
far as active governance decisions it's
basically just setting one number right
and it's still it's still like a
relatively hard to get this right and
the mechanisms for it um I think I still
sort of like being involved and and
improved and so by at you know by moving
to all the collateral dies it doesn't
recognize you know that you're really
dramatically increasing the number of
decisions of this but this process has
to has to make and in my view I think
that that quite possibly increases the
risk much more so than the
diversification maybe maybe reduces it
and then as even mentions there's
there's also this there's risk
regulatory risk that comes in if you're
starting to use tokens that can be that
can be prison by government or custodial
risk if it's something that's backed by
by actual asset being held by a PI
custodian but I think maybe most
important to me anything is model risk
it's just the idea what if maker
governance isn't up to the task
evaluating this ability and relevant
sort of relative risks of a really
diverse before portfolio of assets and
maybe it's worth talking about sir
what you see as in the future these
assets being because I think is not
great it's not just on chain assets as
you said and I think you know that's I
think that kind of risk is maybe what
scariest to me because that's that's the
kind of thing that caused the 2008
financial crisis where you know there's
the smartest people in the world had
models that was fundamentally wrong and
things that they thought were like
triple-a rated debt were actually zeros
and that doesn't that kind of going from
going from valuable there's nothing you
see that happen a lot in these more
complex instruments I don't think that's
likely to happen in an in a simple asset
like aetherium so that's why I'd say I
think the when you see appearance would
drive down we saw an maker destiny
survived a 95% almost dry down in the
price of you when you see this happen
like it happens gradually enough that
the system actually is able to handle it
to liquidations whereas again if you
would have an event like the 2008
financial crisis and a lot of this sort
of like I don't know what behind
mortgages that you would have back in it
where did your not be zeros that seems
like I was like I likely different data
crisis yeah okay so there was a lot of
points and I'll try to like I mean I
think learning the the fundamental point
are like one of the really crucial
fundamental points is this like this
question of the complexity of governance
and finance in general and I mean I
think the most basic thing to understand
is that that risk is is always there
right like finance and money it's just
incredibly complex and just because you
because you ignore the complexity or
don't address it doesn't mean it goes
away and and there's actually no like
when you think about like models and and
sort of like how to think about risk and
so it like that the truth is a sector
that like there's never there's never
like and anyway to kind of solve this
problem I said you just like make it
good enough model or something like that
and that's
kind of like solid solid prop in fact
sometimes thinking that you've you know
the biggest risk is thinking that you've
solved the problem risk and now there's
no longer any more risk right and in my
opinion that really is there's really is
only sort of like only one sort of like
rock-solid truth that you can grasp onto
and that you can depend on and that is
that diversification helps with risk
right that's because in the end if you
think about risk as like you know purely
in terms of blacks ornaments so like
that you never know if whatever Bitcoin
or you or etherium or housing or
anything like you never know if it's all
just like a big lie and it's all you
know it doesn't make sense at all and
everyone was just getting really excited
about something that really didn't make
sense at all right or whatever there
could be some hidden financial
engineering build-up that's gonna make
it all pop or something like that right
and if you assume that that could happen
to anything and there's no way you can
ever prevent that or like predict that
then the only way you can defend
yourself is by making sure that you can
survive that happening to like a piece
of the portfolio of that right so that
even if all real estate takes completely
that shouldn't take that right or even
if all of crypto goes to zero that also
shouldn't kill the system right or and
and the most important like what you
really want to achieve is like a
situation where you can have several of
these scenarios happening at the same
time sort of stacking on top of each
other and the system can still survive
because this like the other critical
point of this is like is maker
governance up to the test right like
maybe even though you know the
foundation has obviously been very
careful in how all them cow is
distributed and really like and in terms
of like them the models until the model
risking like the like just like them the
methodology the focus has always been on
trying to get experts from the
traditional space but like very you know
very broadly and like very diverse but
but ultimately like at least rely as
much as possible in traditional models
so that's just at least there's
something already there that can
don't ABBA but even if that turns out to
not work so well the whole like the
whole concept of maker is that when
there is a loss they pee ah homeless
they have to have salt that loss right
and that actually creates this dynamic
that over time you can see makers this
like evolutionary system that rather
than just like thinking really hard and
like totally like solving risk and that
sort of problem it won't be just be so
smart which is unlikely to be how things
play out right it'll be basically this
like process of trial and error and like
very real consequences of errors that
then make it very clear that you know it
is there's a big advantage to actually
getting it right and and making sure
that this system evolves in the right
direction is our concern for me
in terms of trusted assets is if we were
to play this out right let's say using
token s real estate from you know that
was underwritten by investment banks
like Goldman you know the financial
crisis the problem was these assets were
mis appropriately tagged right and
that's an incentive problem really these
banks were more incentivized to do it
incorrectly than then accurately and
even if we have this very open decision
making you know transparent maker
process we aren't necessarily going to
go all the way down to the way that that
debt or real estate the mortgage was
issued and so how do you see that
counterparty risk playing in or make or
even maybe a leaving like are you going
to start creating risk teams that go all
the way downstream to how the asset was
created or simply at the level of what
assets should be included in multi
collateral well I certainly think that
that exact problem is something where
blockchain gives us the best shot ever
at getting you know very granular data
but I also but actually I think and such
an important point right is that if you
look at something like the financial
crisis it really was like the
fundamental thing that went wrong was
really greed right and like and like
misaligned incentives but more than that
really like greed and and bad culture
and that's where I think I mean what
make him realize on in this
it's like lots of Russian very very
basic psychology of like yeah you might
be greedy but then you're gonna get
slept with you know the entire loss that
you create right whereas the bankers
they knew that the government had to
deal with the fallout
right which is this like horrible you
know like perfect storm of like Reid and
bad incentives and that structure and so
on right but like but actually to like
the only way you can only like you
always have to take it back to
diversification it's like even if you
whatever like solve greed or like you
know have this like have this like you
know at least like it's clear
consequence to being overly greedy and
and you also like dig all the way down
and get all the data about the specific
assets and so on you still have to
always assume that you might be wrong
regardless so again the only thing you
really do and they can still hold on to
us being something that that that it's
very likely to work is to you know don't
depend too much and go with sex only
might make sure you also depend on all
the other investment base and also all
the assets that don't even have anything
to do with invisible things and why does
he's and so on and so on right and
basically accept the fact that many
times you're going to be wrong but
you'll get to learn from those mistakes
and also on a whole if the portfolio is
well enough diversified it'll you know
it'll just be absorbed and sort of be a
part of the general process of the
system so we can potentially solve for
greed here I'm a little bit concerned
that like if that's what makers trying
to do that's that's really running at an
almost bigger target than a government's
process could ever handle and I guess I
I think of the financial crisis is
motivated not so much by greed but by
opacity like we didn't know what those
things were we didn't know who owed what
to who and how these things would
compound and so I think that the maker
process could potentially benefit so
much from the fact that it's all
Unchained and that all the assumptions
are Unchained to like how we're
evaluating these assets how we're
looking at these things becomes a major
difference in how the 2008 financial
crisis played out and I think that
that's my thought to your
dan I mean I think you're exactly right
there's no way the maker token holders
can be doing the evaluation of each and
every one of the decisions that come
across you know that they're they're
sure here with you know what should we
price this one person's mortgage at but
I think the idea is that we have a lot
more transparency and I think we build
systems that over time start to have
their own support networks and they
don't film they filter up in a way that
maker token holders are incentivizing
them to filter up right if there's some
sort of bounty for alerting the system
right that's one way you could design a
crypto economic incentive here for
people to report up dangerous you know
flaws in some sort of model and and it's
a long process I don't think we're
getting there right away but I think
that's that's the sort of long range of
you that it's not about making direct
decisions but kind of like how we're
gonna do the process thing and I think
like for me the model days like
Wikipedia that's like the maker token
allure to become the mods but they're
not the ones that are actually
contributing all the actually data of
like this is what we're gonna look at
here and it's it's a you know not
perfect analogy but I think it's one
that is at least optimistic right that
there is a way to do this kind of
decentralized you know project that
nobody really thought could work and
generate a public good in this case
information in makers case you know
value but I guess I'm bullish but I
think that uh we should be solving for
transparency first yeah yeah I just
typically I mean I don't think that you
can solve greed either and there wasn't
I mean it's a joke that like even if you
solved it that you still actually
haven't fixed the problem right because
they're still stupidity into it but I
mean yeah you can't can't solve
stability you can't solve greed these
are like natural human characteristics
right but but you're totally right with
transparency we're like proper
incentives and then crucially very
strong transparency around those
incentives right and around those
consequences you can at least like yeah
like right like you can use people's
self-interest towards something positive
rather than again in the case with the
financial crisis the self-interest
really was like just misaligned with the
public interest entirely person's
shareholders were incentivize right in
the same way maybe that maker holders
are and you know
ends up being a zero I think like you
know all the bids potentially where the
equity shareholders that were wiped out
or the Saudis leave discount like there
were a lot of incentives there but the
problem is because of just just the
inherent complexity like you set up
finance you necessarily have to delegate
these kinds of decisions to to experts
and ultimately you know that introduces
the same principle agent problems that
you that you're having in big banks and
yes certainly I can I think like a lot
of the of the individual actors maybe of
those banks where we're not correctly
incentivized to act in the best interest
of ultimately the shareholders an
ultimately stability the system that I
don't see how you get around that and in
fact like in maker may even it may even
be more dangerous because because you
have this risk that fee that MPR
shareholder for example could be could
be bribed in order to to make a decision
that this may be to the best interest of
the attacker but not and to their best
interest but isn't ultimately in the
messengers of the value for system of
stability of a system so you have the
view of these new sort of you
introducing a lot of new principal agent
problems they're actually these do exist
in traditional finance of in short
anything short or like your derivatives
to reduce your exposure back when you
own five i if you you know this does end
up like in some ways increasing right a
lot of the indirectness that cause
surprises yeah you make me look too much
of a celebrity so the first one is that
shareholders and banks had the same
reset it's that MK almost have in the
financial crisis which I mean which is
is true right and it to some extent is
how like it on one hand it is how things
are meant to play out but I think also
at the same time exactly if you look at
like the way that that public companies
are currently structure and like the way
they exist in in society like the
framework itself actually recognizes
that there really is a major disconnect
between shareholders and the actual
management
a whole organization and even you know
you up and say that like there's like a
fight between them right and they're
using some legal means to always battle
over the resources between each other
right and I mean if you what I think the
analogy of Wikipedia like imagine if in
the lead up to the financial crisis you
actually had the technology that allowed
you know shareholders to get sort of
like a clear visualization of what what
you know what they were cooking up in
there where like all this those
derivatives and kind of like you know
for instance just see something like
what like what's our what's our level of
diversification right like how much
exposure do we have to two particular
things right and then ultimately you
know at a much more granular level
individual decisions would have to be
okayed on a you know and on a recurring
basis with like a you know almost like
an apple some imagine like a shareholder
app where then they'll be like okay
we're gonna do all these like new CEOs
and we're doing them like you know like
here's a video explaining how we're
doing all these things yes or no kind of
right like that I mean I think if you
imagine that type of scenario and
especially with like blockchain
technology and I guess also most
crucially like a very focused education
campaign that's sort of like you know
towards the shareholders and and
combining all of these things together I
definitely think that you you would have
a much more higher likelihood of like
you know catching something like this in
the aect so okay so that's so that's
like the the first element up right then
the second thing you're talking about I
think it's very interesting is like this
a tech MPI Hollis can be bribed because
so now we're getting into crypt economic
attacks which is like a whole class of
like crazy things you have to think
about when you do defy and and
blockchain apps in general and maker
actually has a very strong defense
against this entire class of attacks
really right because what we like
basically that but what we are what we
are getting into is like the point where
MPI holders might decide that they're
better
essentially using their ability to
control the system for something else
than keeping dice table right until you
I mean I think like the thing is once
you get into governance attack scenarios
and cryptic atomic attacks there's you
very quickly get into let's try to steal
all the collateral so maker is needs to
be built so that it can you know even
survive like everything like all em
calendars colluding and saying we're
gonna correct we're gonna steal look
level and the basic the basic defense is
that there's always like security
delayed on all governance decisions so
that they can be scrutinized to see
whether you know whether like is this
actually like a decision that's just
getting pushed through completely
circumventing the governance framework
and circumventing all like the
transparency and and all the sort of the
you know the day are driven models that
are supposed to drive governance and if
and if that's the case it's very likely
it's an attack and then in the in the
worst case scenario what you actually do
is that you you you actually like do
what's called emergency shutdown so you
shut down the system entirely and then
you take the attackers and Kia and you
you can rip like once you have the
system shut down you can remove the
Tigers I'm care entirely you redeploy
the system do like a migration process
that's quite similar to how we upgrade
to multiple level die will work now and
this is a very extreme scenario but it
really is like I mean the the mechanism
has to be there because of course it
would never work if you could just like
you know steal a collateral or like
damage the system just because you you
control API building power so I think we
have about 10 minutes left
and I think this is a good time to open
up the floor for any questions so if you
have any questions please come up to the
mic up here if you don't have any
questions we can continue you know one
victim good morning I have a question
regarding the migration and the
deprecation
the first single collateral by and I've
asked around a few times in but most of
the time the answer comes down to the
overhead of having to system to manage
and I personally find that it's somewhat
of a weak argument considering the
amount of money involved and I feel
uncomfortable with the fact that the
system would eventually be forcefully
deprecated versus the market choosing
which version of die to prefer yeah and
so on just so clarifying questions are
you specifically talking about that you
think is it would be desirable to have a
version of die that's back to only by
you correct yeah so I mean so so the
first part of that is right it's really
like the thing is that there are there
are level of like security measures and
especially crypto economic defense
solutions built into the multilateral by
code base that just means that over time
it really makes no sense to hold on to
like to single at all die even I mean
even though single that'll die it's it's
been incredibly security tested right
it's been battle tested for years at
this point but you know the multi level
of like code base is actually older than
the single and all that code base like
multi-level that has gone through this
incredibly long like multi-year research
and development process that has
produced like some you know like code
with a level of sort of security s like
principles that are you know an order of
magnitude better than what you haven't
seen for let will die so from a
technical perspective it really is like
I mean if you want to look at like a
timescale of decades it really makes a
lot more sense to rely on the MCD code
base but then to the second point about
there the fact that there might be
demand for a stable and it's only backed
by Eve I mean this is something that we
we that started really coming up in the
community once like basically a parodic
group and just like the people who are
involved in maker crumblin started
realizing that maker governance had for
years been you know figuring out how can
we scale the dye supply and how we
needed real-world assets for that and
this a solution that was proposed by I
mean actually some
some guy on Twitter in in this
conversation was that because maker will
support synthetic assets anyway right so
they'll also be like a euro stable kind
and makers revenants can actually create
whatever kind of synthetic asset they
want that means they could also create a
new asset so like a new single
collateral die which is NI like right
now I refer status a purely died right
so like an like a new stable point
that's backed only by eath but using the
multiple level type framework so it has
all those advantages of security and
also something like that you know the
die savings rate and that's kind of easy
and I'm like the full set of features
and so I think that if they're really
turns out to be a critical mass of
demand for that then it'll be trivially
easy for maker governance to like create
a follow-up single a little die and then
another thing to consider is a single
titled I will actually continue to run
in the background for quite a while even
after multi-level buy launches although
much of liquidity will probably
immediately move to multiple diet like
it's not gonna be forcefully go away
immediately so they should like evasion
I think in the end as long as them
there's enough demand there it'll be
possible for people to to stay with the
kind of stable toy they want and if I if
I understand the way the system works
correctly I think you are free to make a
proposal to the maker multi collateral
die system to make this single
collateral based one so you know it's
not something that you have to rely on
maker making that call you can also
participate thank you if there are any
other questions I guess if we are
simulating a world where we are using
off chain assets which assets would we
use and maybe we have different
perspectives on that I mean I think the
bit like I think it's cool to look at is
that act like the actual proposals and
actual like collaborations that the
foundation at least has been been
looking at recently and okay one really
cool example is paper chain so this is a
blockchain start-up that's tokenizing
royalties for light like music artists
that are
selling music and spotify and they are
and and if you're not like a really big
shot musician you you actually have a
lot of issues who like how do you even
like finance your your you know like
you're near recording and all this stuff
and and they were I don't think that
like they were not very good
infrastructure for people who who
weren't like at the very high level and
so this thought I was trying to solve
that issue by enabling them to tokenize
you know the claim on their on their
future royalties for something like
Spotify and and then this asset can
actually like and that ain't gonna be
like it did so easy 20 token that will
fit straight into into maker and I think
I think that's like a really cool
example of like some very you know very
like out there like type of exposure
then it's incredibly no it's like it
creates a lot of diversity of is the
compared to something like just having
it all be real estate or having it all
be crypto but then beyond that I mean
real estate there's there's several
startup sort of trying to figure out how
to get how like get real estate into
multiple adult I over you know I mean
it's a large journey because of all the
regulation that's involved of course and
the same goes for for trade finance and
there's actually also anything is pretty
cool is like fluidity the creators of s
well they have completely unknown
without any sort of like without ends of
collaboration involvement from the media
foundation create their own like the
whole like own step and and proposal and
kind of like approach of how they want
to introduce t-bills s collateral
especially in order to like generate
sufficient liquidity for dialing enabled
it to like scale in a much more elastic
fashion when there's like big swings in
the market right that's really just
think then did you have them just like
that yeah so I mean I I think real
estate I certainly see the demand for
borrowing against real estate but I I
think you know there's very clear sort
of like systemic risks around it and in
fact I think like you know practically
every credit crisis ever has all that
has been driven by some kind of real
estate
bubbling firing again some leverage in
real estate and so I think I think I
think there's that risk and I understand
the points about about diversification
but ultimately like quite often when
such a crisis happens it hits the whole
sector hits everything
what weirdly enough I think the ailing
like when you if you if you actually
just are tied to an asset like either I
think we've seen that even the sort of a
dramatic fall in the price of ether over
the course of a year was it was it was
perfectly fine for a single collateral
die
I don't yeah I think I don't think we've
ever seen a case where you've had like a
commodity of Model T crash like that
fast or having a crisis or a or a boom
or a bubble driven just by like a single
commodity as Christ and sorry that's
part of I suppose my argument for why I
sort of arguably not the first fine at
all makes more sense from retrospective
yeah and I think it's a good point that
most credit bubbles in the past have
been based on real estate and it I mean
I also think what's especially
interesting to look at is how the
financial crisis was really this example
of like a crash and really where it
really you know it wasn't like the
theory of crash to die survive right it
really was like a 1 to 0 type of crash
but I mean they're also examples of
crashes that had nothing to do real
estate and I think the one that's most
relevant crypto is obviously the dot-com
crash right and and here and like the
thing is the problem with time to die
only to eat and lie creating a stable
coin and creating like a monetary system
that's based only on like that you know
something that is it like it's a little
bit equivalent to like a tech stock
right like I mean like a tech asset
right is that what you're essentially
doing is you're like taking it I mean
okay this is very very simplified right
but imagine if you took the same dynamic
up like CEOs and derivatives upon
derivatives upon derivatives that had
been applied to real estate in the
financial crisis imagine if that had
somehow been applied to like tech stocks
in the dot-com bubble right like because
and because then that would have could
husband have been even more insane and
violent than
then the dot-com bubble already was
right so in the end I mean I think this
dynamic of like and and well actually I
think a really critical point is that
like things only really go ever go wrong
when Finance kind of like starts putting
the cart before the horse right and
that's the that's the problem with with
a decentralized stable coin or like a
single collateralized stable point isn't
that it works great when eath it's kind
of like driving the the show right and
like die is kind of like relying on Eve
for its value but if we end up in a
situation where Eve is suddenly being
like propped up by die because die is
now like this big monetary system and
it's creating all this light it's
channeling all this credit into a
theorem and and that way you actually
end up with it like with die driving a
theory in price instead of a theorem
like driving or like or like stabilizing
that price then that's when if the if
the market starts turning and the theory
price that's falling or it just the die
supply starts shrinking because it turns
out there's a better stable going to
something with that that's when you can
get what's referred to as a death spiral
where you know as the etherium price
falls the die supply shrinks because of
liquidations and because the dice like
die is driving the eve price as a die
surprise shrinks eath fault even more
and that's when you can get that kind of
like 0 like 1 to 0 2007 and where real
estate turns out to be worthless type of
scenario and again their I mean the only
known way to deal with is to assume that
it'll have them at some point
and diversify as much as possible so a
happy medium the way I'm seeing that is
you know you can diversify and also
maybe have on chain assets when we can
have other crypto assets on aetherium so
things like TBT see once that's live
that might be really interesting to put
in multi collateral die i think our time
is up so thank you all for joining us
this early morning and hope you can
follow the multi collateral dark eyes
you