[Applause]
all right everybody time us I have a
very loud voice that this room is not so
large so I'm not familiar the microphone
and you guys it about your being clearly
okay perfect great so thank you for
joining our governance breakout session
thank you also to all the other
presenters we actually have a really
exciting lineup today you're going to
hear from a number of people very very
hardworking very intelligent people who
have fought a great deal about
governance from a huge variety of
projects I think we had about ten
projects representatives that's that's
quite exciting before we kick off before
we dive into governance I thought it
would be very helpful if we start with
some basic introductory material and so
I'll just take a couple of minutes now
to introduce this concept of governance
share some basic terminology do we have
is it talks up are you checking the time
of the timer or yeah okay and you'll
give me here your huh 19 minutes
[Music]
sorry yeah thanks okay this is 46 month
hello
okay cold alright let's time it very
briefly but with background my name is
Lane ready I first and foremost am a
blockchain core developer I've been
writing software my whole life and so
kind of the way I got into the
blockchain space was through the
technology and the code is still the
main lens I use when I think about the
blockchain however so I mean I sort of
have had this crazy journey over the
past two years I worked as an ethereal
core developer for about eighteen months
to two years and more recently I've been
working on another project
it's Hurley I bought my first copy but
so what I kind of discovered as I was
working on some of the core technology
is that you know technology is not a
solution by itself to anything okay
technology is a tool that we can use to
solve problems but fundamentally those
problems are social problems and I think
it's very critical that we attack the
social aspect of those problems first
one of the problems that I think is sort
of unsolved today in watching this
governance and that's why I care a lot
about governance and I've done a lot of
thinking and reading and writing and
speaking about it so this is what we'll
talk about in this quick talk so I'll
just share some goals for the talk we'll
talk about what governance is and what
we're trying to cover in some
terminology quick glance at the agenda
and then if we have any time left
we can talk some more about hearing
permanence as a case thing so my goals
for this talk are pretty straightforward
first of all everyone just warm up get
some caffeine and network though cause I
just want to get people on the same page
about governance right because
governance is a very subjective complex
topic and the reason I call this talk
governance is because many people in
different things when they talk about
governance so just just to get your
juices flowing we'll kind of talk about
some of the different angles of
governance ism of the different
definitions of it and we'll we'll get
some common terminology as well because
you'll hear a lot of these terms used in
some of the talks here today so let's
start by answering or trying to answer
this difficult question what is
governance does anyone here want to
offer a definition but you're paying
attention you seem awake what is going
to get to you how we make decisions
[Music]
okay yes so so max has a very good point
which is that so it's very much about
making decisions but and you also offer
it another piece which is that it were
not alone right it's how we do this with
a penny more John 20 what is that
what does Governance mean to you
collective decision-making process
execution yeah process as well cool
so um I don't intend you to read all of
this but this is just to show you so
this is from an exercise that John and I
and some of several other people never
participated in recently a roundtable
conversation about governance where we
one of the things we tried to do at the
beginning is we try to define governance
we came up with all these different
answers grouped into categories so it's
partly about decision-making it's
probably about collective actual
problems it's partly about power and
authority rules change management so
it's a very great complex topic again I
don't we don't have time to go through
all of these you're free to review the
slides later but the key takeaway for me
is that what governance really boils
down to is exactly what these two folks
over here brought up which is we have to
make decisions together as a community
and that's a very difficult thing to do
right because we all have different
needs we have different values we have
different preferences and so we're
trying to sort of aggregate those
preferences and make the best possible
collective decisions we can and enact
those decisions together so another very
very important question to answer before
we dive into governance is like what are
we trying to govern and I'm going to use
etherium as a case study here because it
just helps to have concrete examples not
the most familiar with the evidence it's
kind of all these things right so like
again just picking on aetherium there's
the governance of the etherion
foundation right and the resources it
controls so that's kind of a meatspace
idea it's very very specific there's
also like the community which is also
neat space in the sense
you know human thing instead of building
in a room you know around the world but
it's much bigger it's very difficult to
define that community
there's the governance of the core
protocol right that's a separate
question and if there's a specification
like the yellow paper in case of a
theory there are independent client
implementations right it's very opposed
something on the order of seven or eight
of these entities to house others and
they each have their own governance
processes there is the network itself
right so this is you know individual
factors running nodes and software
upgrading those nodes there's the data
inside like the box that's the
blockchain and so this is where we have
questions about accountability and
things like that
there's applications I'm sure you could
have more things to this list for the
purposes of today will mostly be
focusing on these two things and
obviously each speaker has their own
take on this each project has their own
take you'll hear about other pieces but
kind of the most relevant and concrete
pieces are protocols how do you govern
the protocol how do we make changes to
the protocol and the data because again
there's very interesting questions here
around availability and around property
rights so this is this is sort of the
main takeaway right is that governance
is complex it's multifaceted it's
subjective this is my own opinion
there's no one like when we talk about
governance we have this desire to kind
of say there's a good governance right
good governance is inclusive good
governance is democratic governance is
representative and bad governance as
other things are none of those things
it's really not that simple right
governance is very situational and I
think that different initiatives need
radically different forms of governance
you know if if we in this room here
that's or 30-ish people in this room
were to get together and you know we had
a task we didn't build something or
construct something maybe you know we
don't need complex governance structures
maybe is a small enough room
we trust each other well enough and
maybe speak the same language that you
know maybe we decide to do something in
a more efficient fashion we elect a
leader and let that would either be a
dictator for some short period of time
and that's maybe perfectly okay again in
this small context of a small group of
people on a small time period but of
course when we scale out to the level of
a blockchain or even further to the
level of a society or a continent or a
nation-state we need very different
things in our governance so I just want
you all to reflect a little bit as you
hear these talks today on them like like
what is good governance but it's bad
governance mean what are the criteria
like thick while there is no absolute
good or bad there are certain things
that I think we can say or certain
properties of many or most good
governance systems and these are things
like inclusivity and restoring a new
permissionless participatory nature of
these systems another very important
point that I hope sets the stage for the
talks today is this interesting question
right so so when we talk about
governance in the context that
blockchain there's two very very
different ankles on it there is the idea
of governance of a blockchain and
governance by blockchain there's a
really incredible researcher named
Primavera that the VP who has done a lot
of really just mind-blowing mean
excellent work on governance in general
on blocking governance I very strongly
encourage you to Google her read some of
her papers and it was her she's spoken
very eloquently about this topic
governance of blockchain is how do we go
in the blockchain itself right and
that's kind of what I showed you a
moment ago when I was talking about what
we're governing governance by law
changes have a much bigger idea which is
that once we figure out how to govern
these block chains then we can use them
to govern things in the real world right
maybe they offer an alternative to some
of our existing institutions and
governance structures whether its
monetary whether it's you know ways to
build better democracies a lot of the
ideas that are being explored in the
radical exchange
things like that but for the purposes of
today we're going to be focusing
primarily the governance of blockchain
right so how do we cover in these
complex projects and my personal goal
was that you know hopefully we come back
a year from now and we figured out how
to govern blockchains and then we can
begin using blockchains to govern the
world using projects like democracy
earth which is not these projects yeah
executed precision all right cool so
let's just try to talk about some very
basic terminology there's a lot here and
a very limited time I'm not going to go
through everything but this is just the
core most important concepts but I think
you're going to hear one of today's so
very very very briefly at enemas ation
is a big part of governance you know how
we incentivize people to flow to
participate to have skin in the game how
you know in the context of blockchain
are we offering block rewards or
validator rewards or something like that
legitimacy and authority are just really
poor sexual questions in any system of
governance what is kind of the source of
legitimacy right why do we believe that
in the context of my home country of the
United States right why do we invest a
power in the supreme or why do we invest
power in the office of President or in
the Congress what is the source of that
is that the Constitution is it a set of
shared values is it something else
what gives those those institutions
authority and what does it mean for them
to have authority and execute Authority
that's Francia credibility you know
they're fairly self-explanatory but
accountability is really really
essential in governance as well so I
would say a property of most good
governance systems is that they are
accountable and no individual no
governing governmental mechanism or body
is above accountability everyone's
accountable is someone else's right
that's what the system of checks and
balances
that's a very essential characteristic
so I eventually checks balances right
kind of different folks different
mechanism keeping each other in check
balancing power
stakeholder this is a very controversial
contentious kind of question who is a
stakeholder is it just people who have a
seat at the table is that people who are
directly impacted by governances at
people who are indirectly impacted by
governance again in the context of
aetherium glads happier I'm sure many of
you are familiar with because you know a
lot to say on this topic has suggested
that sort of all human beings you know
alive today and any point in the future
potentially stakeholders in theory on
governance because you know to the
extent that in theory abhi comes a
network that you know governments are
built on or that's used to govern things
off the block Tanner that money is built
on it's a very expansive definition of
stakeholder and some people have a much
more narrow definition this concept of
on and off chain governance so very very
briefly on chained governance means when
we we make decisions in you know through
the protocol and they're implemented or
enacted long chain this purpose takes
different forms like coin voting tezo's
their area maximal version of this and
Carol are baptize us today off-tank
governance is the old-fashioned type of
governance with with meatspace you know
people have been conversations online or
in person
this is tightly closely related to a
concept called tightly coupled or
loosely coupled which is also related to
binding force it's non-binding
governance Vitalik that's a good article
on a lot of this stuff but again just
this question of like when we make
decisions today take effect immediately
or is there some interpretation layer
around those decisions we have signaling
and voting rights of signaling is
generally regarded as non-binding it's
just a signal input into another
governance mechanism versus voting which
should be binding I think if you look at
like what's happening with brexit today
it's a very interesting question there
was a vote you know and there was a
single vote and you know is it the case
that the government and the entire all
the citizens of the United Kingdom
should be bound by that vote or should
there be another girl friends
finding formal informal governance we
have a lot of informal governance in
networks like aetherium Bitcoin today
where decisions get made in some kind of
complex ways that aren't super well
documented and understood versus more
formal systems where we have you know
legislative bodies and election
processes you'll probably hear a lot
today about different types of forks are
for softworks
they can be contentious or money
contentious we have this concept of like
user activated software Bitcoin I
finally an idea I really really like
which is wet coded dry code this is an
idea that comes from Nick Szabo who is a
legal scholar and a computer scientist
he's the person who invented the concept
of a smart contract as well and proposed
this idea right when code is code that
is interpreted by human brain right so
that's like legal code in that
perspective the word dry code on the
other hand is code that's determined by
machines and so there's this very
interesting balance here between these
two different and how they interact in
the context of blocked hands which we
could talk about for hours that's super
interesting strings he's gonna come up
and join us a chair a bit on her work on
system it governance is super
interesting an important topic it reduce
your self as well I mean everybody who I
am you sure the oh yeah I'm a crypto
economic conference researcher and III
bring to this space of blockchain all
the concepts that I thought about in
the field of complex systems so I'm
going to talk about governance as a
means of coordinating multiple agents
within a system and that there's this
concept of guided self organization
which is basically when you allow agents
to evolve by themselves and to govern by
themselves but you guided a little bit
so that that said that the gun to them
so that they end up in a desirable state
and easier manner there are several ways
in which you can actually guide these
agents so the first way is just to
interrupts and then the second way is
through the design of the dynamics of
the system itself solely by implementing
some sort of systemic control and then
the third way is by constraining the
structure of the entire governance
system so I'm going to kind of
mathematically characterize this so that
it will be easier for you to grasp okay
go alright so it just blasts who here
has played with board Reno's Chopin okay
closer than you might be familiar with
interrupts it's basically this piece of
code that whenever something goes wrong
within the system or if the arena is
running out of jumping processing power
then that come code will come in and it
will modify a certain parameter so so
basically interrupts is just when you
want to change for example if you have
this control variable X then you change
it to X Prime
so that you put it in you put the system
at a more desirable state so for example
if your system gets stuck in a local
minimum like this if your system gets
stuck in a local meadow and say this is
X basically you you go and intervene
into the system to put this back here so
then it's a it's in a what is our goal
state and
governance can just hop it from from
there on so that the agents can just
coordinate themselves from there on so
then you have the problem of or another
way of guiding the subarctic system
using systemic control so this is when
you don't just change the parameter you
change the function that controls the
parameter so you change f of X 2 f of X
bar or f of X so instead of changing or
moving at this point to here we change
the function itself so if you had an
initial function that looked like this
you can make this new function hook like
this or any any kind of functional
modification this is usually manifested
as an art form solid watch-chain and
then you can have entire digital
constitutions
so this is what you want to change the
entire structure in which the government
governance is operating under so you can
go from a democracy to occur Oh a car
key or anything of that sort and this is
something this is when you predefined
the structure of the governance itself
so now you're changing the entire set of
governance policies that is defined by F
1 X 2 X all at the effects of all of the
policies that determine or underlying
the entire governance mechanism so you
change it to G Prime so this will become
basically all of the differences two
sets of functions in which its
moderating hunter and then you basically
transform it to things like this so so
that is that although it creates a huge
enough amount of change you can see how
limiting that is so basically in the
whole field of complex systems you have
this you have to spend out half
self-organisation where you allow the
agents to govern themselves so that you
can observe emergent effects however if
you if you go ahead and if you change
the original Constitution itself you are
guiding the system too much in such a
way that the governance of that system
or the behavior of that system will be
too constrained or too limited in order
to for you to actually observe any
emergent facts so although that's high
impact interpreting and highly
constraining it's not also systemic
control is kind of in a medium level it
has some executional challenges so the
executional challenges with systemic
Controller standards requires a lot of
coordination amongst agents do you know
arrive at a consensus for you know
executing a hard work whereas with
interrupts it's it's very it's very low
impact but at the same time it will it
will definitely create a change within
the system but it's the thing
it's also highly flexible in such a way
that you will be able to observe
emergent effects even if you do change
the interrupts or if you change the
control parameters so those are the
three ways in which you can
mathematically think of how to guide
self-organizing systems and I think that
next layer will be talking about the
different ways in which constitutions
can or structures of events can be can
be designed within itself of their
movement thank you shitty and you're
gonna do a talking later today right we
can dive more into this with you later
yeah okay cool so make sure not to miss
that there is an enormous amount that we
can learn from researchers such as
Shruti who are exploring these ideas of
network theory and systems theory of
complex systems I've just tiptoed into
this space myself and I encourage all of
you to do the same check out this
article is this your article there
should be that's a big italics article
into a constitution cool yeah okay so
I'm gonna end this talk but I wanted to
just show you guys a brief snapshot of
what the rest of the day looks like
so up next we have a talk from that it
was going to talk about history of
democracy and random selection is really
exciting you hear about history of
blockchain governance John I left that
Snoke a title I think I may have throw
that up there but is that accurate yeah
repetition approximates that see that's
approximately right and we have a bunch
of sort of lightning talks of it or
protocols and then we'll kind of
conclude with a few more talks 50
indicates
Ilya and myself and so my understanding
is that this session officially ends at
12 but there's nothing here after this
and the venue is open until 2 p.m. so
I'm happy to stick around than anyone
else else you can stick around we can go
a little over time and maybe we can do a
palace
so feel free to go out grab lunch come
back if your student sticking around I'm
out of time so I'm going to put this on
hold for now let's continue with the
other talks and if we have any more time
later that I'm happy to share more on a
theory of governance with everybody okay
thank you very much for this thing are
you friends here you can't stop her
being shorter than this myself I'm Rico
I'm CEO Anthony Rose we do in dry sports
but I'm going to speak about this now
and we'll just talk about this later but
I'm going to speak about now is and some
of the ideas were widget aerospace which
is random selection right somehow we
think about poaching governance we have
to think that we are thinking out
governance and humans have to serve
governance problems for basically
centuries and millennia and one of the
key features of early day Republic was
that they were based on random selection
of people it is very slow exploding
[Music]
so my background studies economics
political philosophy then I did a PhD in
collective intelligence and this is I
think what brought me to this type of
Tommy's so it's the person to the status
is rationality is always a good thing
for making decisions I tend to think
that personality is everything perfect
decisions but some type word for reasons
can be very bad with race racism rules
are trying to just move forward from
interests as well randomness maze is
that we have a fullest option the option
that is going to be chosen he's not
going to be chosen because of reasons to
be chosen because of randomness so any
of those can be selected and so the
brain what introduces is the apprentice
I what it's called a personality at non
personal decision or in the selection
process this means that a lot every
decision is going to be impartial to be
a moral different things that may be
important for for some political systems
especially when we fear that what
reasons may be used to make a decisions
so this is what's called about
reproducible
you may want to consider lotteries when
you fear as some pathways from
interfere in an additional process right
so we spend a lot of time watching
Lawrence debates about what is the best
way to create a body system and
quadratic like it's forming system in
the end it's a question of how we are we
get preferences so molding is a process
that is based on reasons between the
good or bad and lotteries is a process
at this pace in other regions right and
is excluded both good and bad reasons so
let's see now a bit of some examples of
how this has been used in history of
particular systems because you know with
sometimes think that we are inventing
stuff but we are just discovering since
Harvey will work for working for a long
time in different regimes so this guy is
the guy who created but you know
essentially democracy no there was this
connector called ideas he overthrew he
gets retained in a pavilion and then he
created what we know of the Greek
democracy or the assembly and how it
will evolve etc and you know what you
did after doing these reforms of course
but anyone who disappear so no one know
what if you want but the things that he
created the system and then left it for
the citizens to vanish so you know who
did that by two so this is a basic
structure of the
system citizens can participate in the
assembly
all of them are allowed provided they
are like of course made and the slaves
and the assembly is going to choose
courts Council and magistrate and how
important was random selection in the
city singing people for public office to
the 10% of all the people who were of
the party copies were chosen by lot and
what do you want percent chosen by
election only those that work the very
high levels in the army general
specialized so so that's my note every
year was like the executive power was
the charge of the day-to-day running on
the police and they had this really
specific selection process no this is
the napkin is Greek I think open and she
says not one of these with her name on
it and when there was the day of the
battery process they want to do lottery
machines no it's cool I've been talking
to Sonny for years about this machine
sign this is a machine and they use for
random selection you want you with your
token it's like a brass plate and decide
to put this into a slot machine and then
can some guys on the political process
and good some
white and that dies into the shield
virtue ethics aside and they have like
here is like I co-signed a nice pretty
face guys and if you have on your row of
white eyes you were selected black guys
he went home and is it worth the council
name away why was this used was this not
this way so death in young like
different families that weren't
extravagant for power and they were very
afraid of one of them concentrating too
much power into the police right so
that's going to do this was okay
instead of making elections which can
lead to patronage or can lead to
pollution
it's just selected randomly and they use
metal I don't know about that if there
is some even so Ronald Cotton's can be
in favor of someone it's changed every
year so the world works rotate this or
any potential gain that will be done in
a sharpen band some very lucky random
selection was then destroyed the next
year when it changed all over again
so the two keys of the Greek democracy
were are no selection in rotation
if you want to learn more about how this
process work and every command D status
in a book about the atom is in the
classical news is from the 1930s and if
you want to learn more about how the
political system work in Greece this
great book by Josiah over personal
knowledge of everything and all of the
things that we are discussing dodging
ordnance know this guy's new already ok
let's move forward some time
another important city where they lost
the Hydra use of repetition was was
Rhaenys no Venice was a trading empire
it was known as the Republic asking any
seaman
why is that because the mostly Republic
was intended to give all the merchants
of the Middle Ages element of the
Renaissance the confidence that rule of
law was enacted there right number
Shylock's Merchant of Venice there is a
trial scene and in the try the scene the
judge says okay well I know that this
contract is not call upon the flesh but
a contract is a contract and if we don't
comply with contracts no one is going to
come to Venice to trade it right so the
things that this image very some very
tricky offshore place I'm very that
spirit was built on the second order
because this social structure were again
of some families that were struggling
for power and this families you know
what they have private armies and they
hated each other so that they had to
find a way for this guy to like coexist
in peace in Venice and preserve the rule
of law that was very important for all
of them to prosper from trade you know
this painting and what is this building
and who put it there
scores George
it was the president of the Venetian
Republic and the interesting thing about
the doors is that most of the political
positions most of the office were
selected by not events but the Doge
selection process was very specific
failure in the office so this is how it
is problem that donkeys are like a
blueprint for how you select the door
I'm certain the conceit of Angie this is
harboring 1000 people upon the
patricians participate here was the
parasitic alley and then you have table
selection of all the thousand people 30
members selected there and this 30 guys
went to a different room and draw again
by lot only nine of them so this nine
then went on to 14 nominate 40 members
out of all the 1000 members and the
reader listen when most at ease so these
30 members they went a different room
and then they selected by God to add
members writing and these club members
do you think it ends here selected so
defined member faculty and you know
disenfranchised in scintillated nine
members up to 25 very loud and these
nine members then nominated 45 member by
faulty and this 45 members through 11 of
them by that and this 11th book or the
undici and the only chief nominated 5 up
in 41 members and the 14 members know
what they did
[Music]
process recovery companies to make sure
that no one would dump her from the
process right there was like a shuffling
machine of people right you know and it
probably happened in Venice was that you
don't want me to run for office what
they often say man I
this made politics another perfect
career for people because you could do
nothing to become the daughter it was so
random and you could not like try to
create your alliances and the random
selection also gave all the families the
chance to rotate in the door so this
times you this time is you and so it
rotated and is created like peace among
that right to move you learn more about
how the process works and the
mathematics behind it this is very good
research paper from the protection but
who knows and these guys and the CCC's
that the Doge election process like okay
I'm sorry you're taking a future tense
they come they call that security
together okay when you are in urgent and
you are thinking of various are good
place to do business when you see that
they have this very sophisticated
process and you can trust that the rule
of law we stay right so this is what we
call a security theater even if the
process didn't work one morning one it
still gave the impression that is
[Music]
if you want to learn more about the
Renaissance and sortition
the logistical tiny but Machiavelli
praises his discourse on living he was a
Republican everything he did he wrote of
the prince he's contrary to what he
actually did a separation he was a
Republican and he believed strongly in
people having the right to government
and use news of randomness in selection
and so this Texas to the United States
efficient most important discussions in
the time of the early days of the
country so you know they were from the
English food and now they have to figure
out how they create an estate but that
works basically first time ever and
let's say democracy and we have like
these guys
the felony row for basically
intellectual traditions writing on okay
how should the u.s. worked out the
critical system world president achieve
the Congress to Chandlers one charmer
all these questions they wrote papers
and each one one by that it's not a very
well known it is well known but not as
much as the others and he's called
Thomas Paine and this guy among other
things he created so many things based
on universal income are based in some
races from him and a greater agrarian
society and she is a method of selecting
the president in order to avoid the
federal government will be captured by
the name of the powerful currents so
this is what he suggested and
the colonies who choose delegates to
Congress and then we'll talk a start in
the you select by the drug one colony
out of the thirteen and then those
thirteen members from that colony which
was one member will be president for one
year right so this is what it suggested
because he was thinking of how the
Greeks did write the rotation class
formal selection would tend to break
tradition of power this is the last time
that rotation was really discussed and a
serious level did a mass of course as
you know and anything climb for
extradition declined in the political
world history because of two reasons
what because look to be seen as
application of a possibility length it
should let trivialize looks like more
like can be done but then she like
something this is made way to select
people for office and also because the
classically the Republic people like
working for the common good fell and
what we have is liberal democracies
worried how the people selecting from
representative and the sky governing for
other fears and then the people who
selecting again another that even the
more title is wetland or housing there
was garbage in the world so this ended
in but you know as partisan politics and
that exactly what the ranch and wanted
to avoid when they use this partition so
then I should Greek wouldn't recognize
our systems are reported right these
days there is a movement is really bad
early ideas of partition if you want to
learn more
these are called claret Aryans you know
a lot more French wine and grapes
but these guys are writing for all these
I hope it works
today you have what they call it mini
buggies you select a number of people
for to the cents and then these guys
probably are consulted in policymaking
right there nicely doing one of these in
France now I'll end on the morris and
this is for making policy for climate
change and it's just last week all this
ideas of Sartre Isha and how to create
these political processes that are more
transparent and less prone to pollution
and very likely to pass in existing
democracies now but the thing is that we
have the chance since we don't have to
reform all legacy regimes i we have the
chance of they when we were through this
monarchy suspect and he was still in the
century we've got bill this just dealt
with that we need to build for the
coming time of the internet to be the
absolute we better government so this is
the blockchain thing so we're building
these institutions and we can choose
whatever we want because there are no
ladies now right no legacy to reform so
i think thats artesian can be a really
good way to do it and how we should
think about this well when do we want
the reason to be part of the decisions
when we see that there is a very high
chance of bad prisons becoming part of
then this you certainly so we sanitize
those butter business now when we want
people to express their preferences and
we don't see the possibility of but risk
of being important then yes we can we
use traditional balking systems and
quadratic or whatever it is to be this
constant so you want to learn more about
they say yeah there are like two Bibles
of terminal selection one of them is the
leg of the drum a bit of stone professor
of the University of Dublin is great and
the other one is a liver dominant the
political resolution and this is a
history of how random selection was used
throughout history of politics we can
learn a lot from this thank you very
much Jonathan actually using your laptop
you fell down dramatically
thank you all for coming so early on
Friday but last day of death huh this
week was great so my name is John light
I work on governance for the Aragon
Network and I'll be giving a
presentation about that a little bit
later but my talk this morning is about
a brief history of blockchain
governments so this is this as the title
implies this is by no means going to be
comprehensive
although watchings have only been around
for ten years ten years there's been a
lot of really interesting events as it
relates to governance and a different
block chain networks and so I'm going to
cover just a brief selection of some
real events that have stood out to me
over the years but again this is by no
means comprehensive if we could probably
talk about this all day so thank you so
[Music]
the first one I'll cover was the CBE by
2010 51:39 southfork in August of 2010
so this was a bug in the midpoint that
caused about 80 184 million Bitcoin to
be created
basically someone just exploited to
create some transactions that created
you know all these Bitcoin out of thin
air and people notice this and work
understandably alarmed and a patch was
quickly developed and circulated in the
community Satoshi
gave the patch his blessing and and it
was very quickly adopted a soft fork for
those who are familiar with the term is
a fork that restricts the ruleset of the
consensus rules and of watch-chain and
[Music]
in such a way that it's backwards an
apple so so basically transactions that
are created under the new rule set are
compatible with old notes that have not
adopted the new rule set yet but
transactions that violate the new rule
set that are created by old moves are
rejected by the Dinos so basically this
this this fork said that any
transactions that create these 184 Billy
Bitcoin or or create these Overflow are
transactions are invalid and everything
else is valid and they basically kind of
like rolled back the blockchain to
before the piece behind an ad for
Bitcoin were created included all the
valid transactions and then continue on
from there and this was kind of done in
and I think in kind of like to God a
very good community driven fashion so
this is the patch that that Satoshi
I published and put out and the
blockchain pretty quickly over it's off
the bat block team so then there was the
one megabyte block size limit southport
in 2010 September 2010 so this one was
done kind of quietly that's good so she
didn't really announce it he just kind
of like published this made this
commitment the code base and then pushed
it out people adopted it it was bundled
as a soft fork again along with some
unrelated changes and then it was
scheduled to activate at a specific
block height so once the block ID was
reached in the blockchain the soft board
activated and from that point forward
no blocks could be created that we're
bigger than one leg quite so this was
time done basically by Satoshi almost in
secret and this is the exact code where
it adds this limit so you can see that
there you can see if the network height
is greater than seventy nine thousand
four hundred blocks then and the block
size is bigger than the max block size a
constant and you get it returned in
error but yeah this was done kind of
sireesha Slee so Toshi did this a couple
of times too he just kind of like
slipped in consents
rule changes so that it wouldn't be too
controversial and they wouldn't have to
you know debated so they said then there
was a proposal to increase the block
size limit because people were like this
is a kind of scale so of course once the
block size limit was activated
you get people dependent kind of talk
about it in public and so Jeff Garcia
comes along and he said he introduces a
patch that would enable Bitcoin to
miners to produce as a type of produce
valid blocks larger than one megabyte
and the community kind of pushes back
and says hey people don't like download
the install you're gonna become
incompatible with the network because it
would be as hard for it at that point
wouldn't be backwards compatible and so
the network would split is basically
everybody did not install it at the same
time so Toshi kind of it also pushes
back on the idea so Toshi says if this
is gonna make you incompatible with the
network don't run it but here's how it
couldn't be done
however it was never done the way that
since I she suggested it so the one
megabyte limit persisted for quite some
time and we'll talk about how that says
that that big one over the years so
here's you know Jeff Karthik's post
saying like oh this is how we could do
it and then Satoshi is like don't use
this patch you if you install it you
will make yourself a compatible the
network to your own detriment we can
feign something to change later of
course if we invoke certain eating it so
then there was the mid-30s south
born-again ass off the board
whereas before Satoshi would activate it
by block height this one was activate
by kind of a flag days so it was based
on the time stamp that a walk was
created rather than the exact walk
height it's 30 I think this was
basically a change that prevented two
transactions for having the same
transaction ID with the exception of two
specific blocks that they didn't want to
have to like refer about transactional
is confirmed in the past but from after
it 30 was activated from that point
forward two transactions could have the
same transaction ID and so this was
activated on a specific day and it says
right here like this rule applies to all
blocks whose time stamp is after March
15 2012 at 0-0 UTC and that was
published by Peter wheeler so then there
was the fifty hard work and 2013 no
notice most of this is Bitcoin because
like Bitcoin was really the only coin of
significance at this point
sorry to all points so then there was a
50-word fort in 2013 to March May 13th
so this was kind of the first like big
bug like this was around the time that
bit when I shot up to like 150 200 L or
something like that so it was happening
in a lot of like and a lot of like price
drama
bid 15 AK there was a there was a bug
called the Murphy DB bug that caused a
chain split it was the longest chains
plate of England's history so far that
like accidental chain split and then 50
was gonna activate it on the
we're using Flag Day of hardboard which
which which created a basic backwards
incompatible change to fix this earth
BBB and like here's the code to do that
once again has this like rule where like
you know if the block time is greater
than one
whatever this time is 11 March 2013 then
the unit one in this world and then
after May 15th will lack salute that
will actually relax the world so when
they relax the rule that was a hard work
because basically any anything created
after that point was incompatible with
software that's running before that
point so it's technically a hard work
although some people might debate
whether that was actually a hard court
so then there was a really interesting
event in a coin called fair coin
it's the first rollback that I know of
that actually kind of like was was
almost like a a kind of like that
justice related rollback so basically
there was an exchange called mint mint
ow that was hacked and 30% of the fair
coin supply was golden now very poignant
was a proof of state point so if 30% of
your proof of state coin is held by
somebody with perhaps less than good
intentions well they're locked in some
trouble so they decided you know we're
going to roll back the blockchain and
reverse that that transaction is not so
very controversial in America
entity and has anyone ever heard of bear
coin and see how you know successful
that it's made there blockchain but but
in any case you know a lot of people did
think that it was a good idea because
again 30% of your coins and a previous
state watching being helped by an
attacker is maybe not the best thing so
I thought that was really interesting as
the earliest time an example that I
could find him a kind of like a reversal
of a theft rather than a kind of fixing
of above the way the earlier buffer
overflow rollback was was done a big one
so then moving back to Bitcoin bin 101
was added to Bitcoin XT so Bitcoin XT
the the main Bitcoin client in the
Bitcoin network today and back then was
called Bitcoin QT or Bitcoin core this
was the derivative or I should say
descendant of the client that Satoshi
Satoshi himself wrote big when XT was
developed by a big development team so a
former Bitcoin core developer named Mike
Hearn had this client called Bitcoin XT
that he was doing some experimental
stuff with and then there was a bit or a
Bitcoin improvement proposal 101 that
was implemented to increase the block
size to 8 megabytes now Bitcoin court
did not adopt this if it would have been
a hard fork and
or against a hard fork to increase the
block size of the men at that point but
there was some movement within the
Bitcoin community to increase the block
size limit so Bitcoin XT implemented
this and was basically trying to
convince people hey you know Bitcoin
core isn't responding to the community's
demands for an increase in the bus
estimate you should run big planets
instead and so this was kind of one of
the first examples of a Bitcoin client
kind of going broke and going against
consensus in the big news network
so later 2015 miners and physicists were
signaling support for bigger bought
plots so mining pool operators like
signed a letter saying you know we all
support up to 8 megabytes or even 20
mega byte blocks in tune and then of
prominent businesses kind of did
something similar a bunch of popular
Bitcoin wallets and payment processors
and such also signed the letter saying
you know we support bit 101 or a
megabyte block size of the mint this is
what the miner letter looks like you can
see f2 pool and pool party and
there's a VW and kind of a date stamp
there they represent it as a pretty
significant share of the hash power in
the network and then also blockchain
bitpay and a bunch of other businesses
assigned this industry letter also
supporting bigger blocks nothing really
became of this because the Bitcoin
network is hard to change okay so in
2015
August 2015 the - now goes live so I
think this was perhaps the first example
of a blockchain that basically like to
hook a portion of the block report so
the new coins ever being generated and
then gave it to a specific kind of
entity and said like dude do it you will
witness and that specific entity was a
network of what are called master nodes
which are - she knows in the vacuum
network that have locked 1,000 - tokens
in their wallet once they've done this
then they get a voting rights to vote on
how these this portion of the back
reward that has been split off kids is
spent
fast-forward to July of 2016
Athenian splits after the DAO incident
so basically here you know someone
figured out to think of like you know
why are you unilaterally withdraw money
from the Dow which was a smart contract
not that they did not deposit and they
use this to try to Train like most of
the money out of the Dow the etherium
Network reacted by basically creating a
hard fork that was trying to reverse
this change or like reverse this event
and that's the the network ended up
splitting into what we call aetherium
today
which was
to change where the funds were returned
to the original owners and then a 3m
classic which which was at the time you
know the original chain where the the
person who originally tried to withdraw
money from the Dow actually got the
money and and on the etherion classic
chain that that history is still
preserved today so then in 2017 there
was the the block size debate in Bitcoin
was kind of coming to a head there were
there were kind of the three main
competing proposals at various points of
time throughout the year
one was called set with you ASF or user
activated southport one was a b CH or
Abednego cash and the other was a segue
to X and these were all backed by
various factions of the community so a
set the story here is that sec wit which
was a change in bitcoin that fixed
transaction malleability and and also
happened to decrease the block weight
limit to four megabytes was really
intended to be activated by a minor
activated southport so basically the
idea was that miners would signal up to
like I think it was 70% support and once
they've got to 70% support the change
would activate well segwayed failed to
gather enough support for miners so
Bitcoin users decided to activate that
with themselves basically they would run
software that says at a certain block
height or whatever we will start
rejecting any blocks that don't conform
a segment
sorry miners say with 2x was a group of
folks that proposed a compromise of we
would increase the block size limit like
double the block size limit and
implements that would everybody gets
what they want
well I think work out when the when the
was looking like the user activated
sophomore was actually gaining momentum
and was going to get activated some
minor is that felt threatened by this
decided to just create their own heart
Fork to increase the block size limit
without set with and created this new
point that we now call Vic one cash for
BCH and now with a new chain that had
you know more a bigger block size limit
and said with activated through a user
activated Southport asset the wind was
completely taken out of segment to exit
sales and the segue to export was
eventually expanded by the people who
originally proposed it like to more
slack so yeah deke Ren then in June of
2017 activates its first upgrade using
an option governance mechanism so this
was a way that basically what are called
like take a whole craft block chain to
vote on a change to the consensus rules
and then but just by voting the
consensus rules would actually be
changed automatically people didn't have
to upgrade their clients their clients
which is recognized
oh this is the way that ticket holders
voted these are the changes I'm
automatically going to accept these
upgrades so this is kind of the first
example of successful and honoring
evidence in action or like on chain
tightly coupled earnings over the
rules specifically and then most
recently password to your June 2018
idios has launched it was launched they
also have this idea of like on chain
governance over consensus rules they
wanted to pick a constitution that was
intended to bind how these rules would
change and of course block producers
like the equivalent of miners
immediately violate the Constitution
they decided to you know I really freeze
some accounts that had been identified
as potential stammers in violation of
the FIA's Constitution which had
actually intended for that kind of
action to be taken by a separate
arbitration body so they kind like
routed around the Constitution to extra
legally you know impose justice in this
case once again a fast wording to April
2019
this year illegal use legally scraps
their constitution for a new user
agreement the reason why you know it's
characterized as illegal is because they
adopted this youth new user agreement
with only one point seven four percent
turnout despite the fact that their
constitution and actually required them
to have a fifteen percent turnout to
make this kind of changes so so far you
know the blocking governance is not
going so well for refer for us and this
the end of my presentation because we're
a 20-9 team now and there hasn't been
anything like incredibly new or novel
that's happened since then so with that
I will end the presentation
thank you for talking favors with me and
I think we'll hear more from Tesla's
better stay that was this year yeah yeah
I think the reason why I included it is
because it's while a certainly a
landmark event itself it wasn't the
first time that I wrapped my suite we
have Alfonzo avenged speaking about also
speaking about hook it up governance so
this is the first of our lightning talks
and then from this point forward we're
going to hear a series of talks to learn
and do a little bit of a deep dive on
much different protocols so we're going
to get so high percent their visits
about the dangers of I use computer
scientist and mathematician betrayed me
working things related to dimension
algorithms and also some his real
reviews
the governor's populist taste in
staccato quality don't run for it so it
is not perfect but it's the best cut I'd
say some of the problems that people
like to point out with commodities that
is usually learn to not it's too slow
governance and it has to be able to
curse it has to keep our to win a lot of
points so I'm going to present ways in
which we combat this produce some of mr.
Hogan potent we're going to use time ops
which means that it matters not only how
much we cut but also how long you're
willing to lock these points because you
are actually you are very much committed
to a system we have several governance
bodies that has some advantages first
one is a increase in speed because there
are more channels to decision-making and
the second is that there are more checks
process because they can check to each
other and we try to give power to
minorities and we obtain that in two
ways why proportional precipitation
making sure that minorities are as well
second is an acquittal rate I will say
more about that later so who are the
stakeholders
I hope you are well coconuts
I respect complex and I don't have time
to go into it
there are validators that it was a
brought the consensus protocol there
illuminators coin holders who supports
the election validators and they get
rewarded to medical validators their
parents franchise also have to uphold
God's because they needed to secure
conscience that so the projects that's
are gonna be given out at least some of
them are going to give given out through
just actually okay and of course misters
there are others and their own account
holders and I would like to point out
the first ones are love at Second Sight
liquid we want to give having more voice
to whatever there are not because as I
said people with love stake have more
skin today and we can trust that they
meet they that I care more about the
future of okay so decision making
governance is going to be based in
referendum they are going to be
different about once a month and please
there's a public proposals anybody is
free to propose there's sponsored
proposals
oh there can sponsor a proposal that
they liked and then once one we're gonna
take the most popular proposal addresses
to referendum just when we voted one
month and there's really not many late
that is the time between deciding
something deciding our proposal and
actually implementing this is important
because it is our two people who didn't
agree with it to actually leave the
system so that they know that something
is going to take place in two weeks
some days to decide to move to sell
their goods in there like it so this is
some protection for some protection
there's a voluntary type of editor so
everybody else and we has to lock the
cons which they but if they decide to
talk for a longer fuse and it's high
time that it's faster yes take this body
council can be elected by stakeholders
their motion is to represent the
interests of the stakeholders and
something I want
is that the way we elect the custom
universities through something called
the Russian representation which
basically means that if this 10% of coin
holders that have similarity twists then
they're guaranteed to be represented by
at least 10% of the seats in the
crossover or the same 20% or the same
with 5% this is very different to some
other kind of representation systems
were only really two big majorities the
center than the one that says no sample
so we really want to stress various
because also this gives checks and
balances because the council has some
power and we want to make sure that it
represents everybody and if there is no
limit in the console then they basically
have no power well that's a good thing
it's very hard to for the console to
have supermajority silence on the things
this is so nice laughter of a sense this
personal presentation can imagine that I
recall it represents something ideal has
some different point of view and each
one of them is going to get one wish
that even possible
oh the gentleman over there I'm not
sorry just say what the thing also can't
stop can mitigate artificially dangerous
inhalation proposal to confess directly
for proposals but as he said mostly mine
it doesn't have a lot of power so yeah
so just be passionate as how so a lot
will never obviously so it's very long
time what it is but basically I'll hear
about process of competitions us like
guarantees and improve state not he was
multistage on shade covers my resident
and getting a said it's also an
architectural thing those governance
it's actually that's a metaphor to call
it can technically accentuated Lakshmi's
bird calls theoretically but basically
it tells us you know the underlying you
know the way that Bostick rated and you
know consensus through this notion of
baking and little bit mistake so you
have basically the mentorship of Baker's
joining pesos the first year obviously
there's a big increase in the first few
months and that sort of a study enough
it's not as delegation so people can you
know move their stake designers take to
you know these various speakers around
the world but it's not depots in the
notion of another way of do a search on
or listen anything like that I fell
obviously funded by that point of
inflation appreciates that and so then
those make it uses in practice it is
actually officially almost 500 elevators
and all 35 countries at least that's
what we know publicly you know a leaders
stay where they are what they're you
know what they're what they're doing and
so you have to sort of the participants
in this government system are basically
across many different
there is additional folks running really
complex you know copy setups there's
books on Raspberry Pi there's folks just
with ledger and dresser you know in
there in threes men and there's 110 of
these public delegates you know of these
four so they go for 450 to 500 as it
varies very big town of the Republic and
vote on other people's behalf and then
you have about percentage of the nura
that's involved in this process about
71% of the Joel supply I think it's
about 80% of their activity and so then
what's the actual process so it looks
you know very you know complex but it's
actually much simpler than that it's a
basic Rises for periods and someone this
is changing potentially in a week if we
activate a new upgrade but basically it
involves it starts with this proposal
period each of each of these mercury is
a months for about 23 days I think
basically 20 and the proposal period is
this period where basically cannot put
as many people succeed like I think
agent I'll go into some of the similar
detail in the next talk but basically
you have this core face period it's a
very conserved on like this or the
polkadot model it's a very very
conservative sort of a governance
process by which easily have to hit this
this quorum you know very very high bar
of consensus it started about 80% and
some of the original Athens votes
it was as high as I think
2% to the quorum I mean we talk I had
about essential estate is about 86 or 87
percent above the stake actually voted
or participated in the vote basically on
this proposal period even have a yes/no
maybe both yes them over passed but
really in the second period testing
period which you're not going to get
into another yes no or maybe a state
confirming that a protocol in our
proposal should make it to become the
new protocol and set aside about three
months to complete
so going back to you know such earlier
so what was a sentence was our first
proposal I went from at the end of
February to the end of May it was
basically just voting on changes to
constants so it was just changing in
both sides which is just the either them
account for previous statement SS that I
have mentioned earlier and it was
doubling
you know basically Oh Paul doubling the
Gosselin poseable not that basically the
participation as mentioned earlier 87%
of stake in the expiration vote about 84
percent a stake in the promotion code
and the reason is so high is because
bakers are mediating beginning to votes
for for folks there's not as a required
every single person holding a token to
participate in this it's mostly symbolic
so there's just a little you know we
have the significant inflationary
invoices well I won't go into that right
now but as mostly symbolic just about
100 xdc
reward and it was really just changing
some constants and why only one team was
really involved in the you know in the
creation
the Furcal tournament and but you know
obviously pretty landmark about this is
that it involved coordination etc
communes own circle 35 countries and
about 200 meters you know and so then
the newer upgrades are in a new upgrade
network we're going to now instead some
operating just like change our no
constants you know to actually like
constantly the notion of crossed upgrade
so actually hopefully every also babies
every form of revised every six months
even you know some regular cadence of
pretty much a Nissan feedback and a new
innovations that have been refined in
you know engineering his basic engineers
that prepares core dev team so can
propose to the stakeholders also there's
the vanity fashion because the original
proposal and now see a haven't
unfortunately had an issue in this one
so we're actually been voting on a
slightly different one another another
time coach all these each other supports
in there but basically there are a lot
of challenges to this process so one of
them is that you know one with you know
it's very decentralized is actually you
know there's actually you know nearly
500 you know different enemies that are
all around the world participating in
this and there's also the issue sort of
some some minor tires fragmented and
that we we've found determine doing this
in the wild around you so for example
what happens if you find a bug you know
some way through the process we've been
going through that recently and they
you know the most recent case we start
we found it before the final but they
know called confirmation quote but in
other cases you could imagine this being
having been a consensus solution and so
then you know also there on the court
you know you have served questions of
coordination Ecija you know all these
different forms in which people are or
discussing amendment you know that many
thought you know across you know us that
their country so about language barriers
a lot of cultural differences that you
including you nobody sustained the
experience of you know with voting
praises and in terms of democratic norms
all those kind of things you have
different different tastings and then
also we've had ever serve proposal
sisters I mean breast see breast and in
Edina Paris
Perry started in France and this is from
the you know from June so you surf clubs
notion of new people sort of trying to
attack so it's you know potentially
capable for other purposes if you can
get your proposal if you want you to
want to work off you know you can insert
a proposal about it you know you know
not fruitcake
it tells of the process and then you can
you know basically that gives you social
charity before about we're going you
know serving serving this kind of
dynamic for a while now and then other
questions you know obviously about tests
and other mechanisms that form only say
cos we're not the rest right so you know
the answer here is really I think a
little different than that I think I
think it's not just about the question
of
the doctors whatever it's actually
intangibly how do we ensure that we have
flexibility against sort of hard upon
chain rule so you know you look at
things like Bitcoin where you know
originally mining was actually really
widely distributed you sort over time
there became a companies of scale that's
not quite analogous but the point is you
don't actually know who's going to come
to and if you have hard coded rules you
don't understand Oh who's going to come
to a control system long into the future
and so you need other mechanisms are
potentially other other systems to
ensure that enough flexibility and so a
few of these are you know that the
discuss are in terms of things you know
sort of inspired by it it's sort of now
Ellis is sort of inspired by dowel stock
that is like you do prediction games on
proposals to write proposals you can use
this to mitigate you know certain
governance by state potentially you can
also do that you know there's all sorts
of you know if you want this to be you
know sort of this economic
infrastructure that can upgrade itself
very conservatively you can basically
set higher approval thresholds for
certain parameters or other
characteristics of proposals that you
don't want to change you'll be able to
change and then the other question is
like you know basically our small
stakeholders and smart entrepreneurs
just curl and this is some sort of well
you know who's looking out for it is or
other folks whose was you don't have as
much insight into it so you know just to
wrap up to that someone things
for a while scholars is basically how do
we do we get easy for many many staple
from the world to understand what's
going on the process and also address
their different preferences and so you
have you know initial laser focus on
telling surface governor's Explorer of
flora but later into the ideas to build
you know sort of a full speed of
signaling tools so you know as well as
your visual on prediction markets and
then also things like house for
governance as well as for Commons
governance it looks like domain names
and registries and other kinds of things
like that and then the last thing that
things like I don't
you sort of a more such resistance yeah
awesome thank you yes
so I have two slides because that mostly
go to wipe out this so I'm Adrian a
month two naps so very briefly 50 laps
is for engineering team that also
happens from now they ask you to sell me
start occupants and banal gives us love
inside these government systems were
because we set up having to run every
single through a state can be only one
of the things that are technically
interesting and we're very heavily
involved in the technical governance on
these systems so I must defer to mr. on
and in June respective of micro just
aging detective these proposed evolve
over time since G have said that I
should briefly talk about the technical
settings so tell us government supposed
to call it to that as well
top 10 works is for white votes cool all
right
let's start with a brief over your fault
options are right we have some
networking stack normally
can relocate and we have
[Music]
then we have some consensus death and
afterwards we have some economic state
machine
[Music]
stay cheap this is front one because
this is completely agnostic so when you
think about what those have better
features Ryoga is networking out we see
calls everything better is local to your
note it's totally up to you that's we
have many very tiny mutations that right
doc changes generally have many clients
the only two things that they do agree
upon is consensus and in our protocol so
for example in the example of cosmos
this will be 10 min consensus and this
would be the cosmos hot or gaia
depending on you succeed to naming
incorrectly we'll see that's currently
some contention about this and there may
be new government's proposed about this
as well but specifically the economics
eat machine success what is golf it's
actually how do you get to move funds
around husband statement ok cool
now that you know this I am and when we
talk about governance in many cases we
talk much more about this and this so
many systems have modified their
governance the consensus systems over
time those are mostly stapled but I
think we should most experiment also
improving a little time for guiding tell
us governments this is quite interesting
because it effects the long this time
and so what happens is that there's a
tough shell which you can imagine that
it's a local thing that everyone have
their own version of and it as important
takes some protocol where the protocol
is combination consensus and economic
kernel and this protocol is written on
panel and what that happens is that the
note will Michelle and all this makes a
signal
what happens is that the shell takes a
bunch of a camel sauce files and that
runs the restricted subset of the camel
compiler to turn the protocol into
something that can be dynamically linked
into the run itself and then execute
attendant but ever shell receives
network messages from other peers of
Excel blocks in transactions and drives
the single-threaded state machine which
is the protocol the cool thing here is
that due to this you can build a binding
onto a governance system where someone
or anyone through all really can inject
a bunch of calluses files everyone votes
on the on the hash of those sauce files
and if everyone in the net worth enough
people whatever your acceptance criteria
is and take we talked about this earlier
agree on the sauce funds the know that a
predefined block again given the upgrade
will decide so the shell will return the
protocol over time this at the next
clock which should be using a neutral
color and at that point the shell will
use the sources that it currently has
compound them on the fly and then
dynamically linked them into the running
binary and that way towards camp Red
Cloud is to infect the same thing with
an wasn't where people vote on about
what code and them know dynamically
will switch to the new protocol but this
is how you get binding on to governance
because in order to opt out of this
change people have to modify the shell
and then they can say well like the
shell should not great to the steep
vertical but the thing is in most cases
you will also have to slap a significant
percentage of your total us because what
can happen is that say you don't night
version a like critical aid which is the
protocol and so you'll only go and part
by this and you now have only four
people ten percent of never
this but you did modify the balances on
the new protocol aid and you can anyone
can reject what the community wants to
upgrade to and then they you exactly the
same vote and by default all notes again
will upgrade to view photo so you
effectively either have to cut keep hot
forking to prevent new protocols are
being injected or you slash 80% token
balances of the people that actually
want the new change this is why all of
this is cool and that many different
ways to implement this tells you this is
a restricted subset of the account
compiled a blocker abilities wasn't as
long as the important thing has to be
deterministic and properly sandboxed
because otherwise if this isn't properly
sandbox you're building massive plot
that where anyone can upload code tune
that would then automatically get
executed everyone's machine and through
a stick this is specifically scary
because all of these machines fault
hotkeys that are using content designing
and kind of incur significant slashing
analysis if they were compromised yeah
we have to be really sure that code
probably sandbox account compiling from
the sandbox to an interpreter for all
these programs cool
without this is a quick intro to
technical spective one minute all right
then really quickly we caught this so
cosmos goals
[Music]
new whiteboard series so there's a 40%
form
okay for example and strict majority so
50% and 33% veto power as quick
explanation it means so cos the weight
works
it's a signaling process signals Gannett
system why anyone in the world can
upload a text proposal needs to pay five
from 12 atoms as the deposit this is to
prevent spam but once they've uploaded
any one can all the values can build on
it and hopefully delegate us can
override the balanced choice but by
default they inherited so it means that
if you want to delegate your voting
power to felled it or you can but if you
validate them does something batshit
insane
you can overwrite this to say in order
to be valid it needs to have for 20% and
of those 40% at least 50% at least half
the audience not half forecast and that
is rejected and if partly if something
is rejected do not get you to college
mark as he just felt like one and a half
thousand dollars if that happens and
also due to the way est works if more
than a third ever vote no oh no we don't
everything it won't get accepted by them
because in either case if one third of
the network doesn't like something they
can always fault the chain so this is
why there's a no veto threshold here all
right then yeah the cool thing about
having signalling proposals is it kind
of many of the same time so do these
kind of governance upgrade binding on
Czech government operates very voter
code you can't have many at the same
time because it is incredibly difficult
to figure out how you merge two distinct
code bases into each other to form over
here in protocol that still maintains
properties like the design properties of
either so the same MO
many fun at the same time the deposit
face runs for two weeks and afterwards
the voting phase run to another two
weeks
the downside is it's very clear what
couldn't happen after vote has been
successful right because we don't
actually know the specifics so due to
this the way you upgrade the code bits
of the cosmos up is that you first had
bunch of votes on we want these new
features and then hopefully someone
builds those new features and afterwards
you have a secondary vote but where you
vote on the specific half of the code
that you wanna run and if you find
cousins governments at all this was the
very I don't want to say funny I spent
like six hours sitting in audience
anyway there wasn't vote for the cousin
seventh grade which turns out wasn't
properly tested the migration procedure
was probably tested and due to that the
new constant of three didn't actually
start and so we had to roll back to
cosmos up to this cost down to two hours
at mass months confusing I was very sad
as I said it very loudly that's in a
cage for six hours while trying to
figure out what to do that so in my
opinion honestly some of the best
government models will combine both so
you will have some sort of signaling
proposal proposals because it allows
error in the community to have a voice
to suggest changes to get ideas of
high-level goals that you want to
achieve right like do we want a picture
wasn't do we want to have any consensus
mechanism is how do we remember one and
once you saw a broad concept are drawn
agreement over where you want to go then
someone builds it and once they've build
it vote on the space specific
implementation so ever on increase
everyone upgrades to it automatically
yes okay cool
I think I counted most of the points and
only thinking like five minutes all
about the thing so thank you very much
I'll be around later if you have any
questions I can talk to you most about I
can talk to you about either $10 off
government systems we happen to spend a
lot of time on them so here comes miss a
meal Thank You Ellen
and so for those of you who are
unfamiliar this here it is sleep in the
deep reading ecosystem stately
represents a ticket which is a float on
the network and it's kind of like a
community a big mess now before I begin
the talk I just want to extend a special
thank you to be there and community for
extending an invite to us D cred doesn't
have any explicit link to atheria so
something that I do find the degree I
probably a third committee is not only
its positivity but also its willingness
to welcome ideas that exist outside of
its immediate ecosystem as I know that
the cryptocurrency space can often time
to be quite tribalistic it types of
things so for the talk today I'm going
to focus D creds model has quite a bit
of complexity to it so I'm going to
focus less on how it works and more so
why we implemented that implemented it
that way okay so for a bit of historical
context before have some of the for the
developers in the room you might be
familiar with some of our developers
previous open source work so Meyer 2d
cred many about developers spent over 15
years in a way tell people be as
but yet they then moved into very early
Bitcoin development releasing BTC sweet
and Reese's T at btcd which at the time
was the first alternate full node
implementation of the coin then they
moved on to release Christiana Tomac
swaps so that was released and made
open-source by Davis one about the girls
tends to be one of our more prominent
open source contributions so the reason
why I bring this up is that for de
credit governments wasn't really an
afterthought it was something that was
carefully planned because the team had
spent quite a bit of time prior dealing
with open source communities and having
to deal with the various conflicting
stakeholder groups within the Bitcoin
ecosystem and so for that reason it said
so I lost my chain of thought but we'll
just go to the beginning so that these
deep rivers originally conceptualized
around 2014 so that was roughly around
it at the time that the team started to
transition away from their Bitcoin
development then we leader underwent
about roughly two years of development
we later released it quarter 1 of 2016
then in quarter 2 of 2017 we had our
first launch chain voting process so
John alluded to that in his early talk
and this was really the first time we
actually got to
demonstrate the core of Ekron sales
process which is our ability to
implement user activated hard Forks now
to my knowledge this was actually first
time a user activated hard fork has ever
being observed in the cryptocurrency
ecosystem and then since then we're
starting to focus a little bit more on
off chain governance which is
specifically relates to the coordination
of the various different contributors
and the products resources so whilst we
were fairly early in recognizing
governance as a problem I want to make
it clear you know that we're not so
arrogant as to assume that we're some
kind of governance in a sale I think
that just like watching itself there are
many correct ways to implement
governance and depending on the
particular problem that you're looking
to solve the effectiveness of a
particular governance solution is going
to depend very heavily on that so in the
context of de credit we suppose that we
focused specifically on a bond chain
quaint halter led governance
specifically as it relates to the
consensus change process and so I'll
just briefly give you an overview of how
that works basically we utilize a hybrid
model that blends both the proof of
state with pro court so probably easiest
way to visualize this
something like that assembly line so
what happens is whenever a minor about
produces is producing a lot they have to
select a number of tickets over votes
and random from the stakeholders into
their lungs now in order that want to be
considered valid in order to actually
successfully posted and receive the love
reward a majority of the votes they
include within that block need to be in
favor of whatever clock particular block
type of this event and those votes are
selected at random to the minor can't go
into select every choose the votes that
are exclusively in favor of whatever is
invasively
now so that the whole process is on
chain and binding so once an approval
threshold of at least 75 percent of the
votes within a which of the voting
window have been accumulated
then whatever change gets automatically
implemented so an example of this might
be pro or anti segregated witness okay
so the thing but coin holder blood
governance is as Lane alluded to it
doesn't necessarily take into account
almost all the possible types of
stakeholders that might exist that's
definitely very true but what it does do
is it it does constant paucity wider net
to program work miners alone and so that
was really the point behind
is that we didn't want to eliminate -
because we felt that they play an
incredibly important role and we're
still huge advocates or group of work as
a consensus model we just felt that they
need to be a great level of
democratization in the governance
process okay so in the context of coin
will have led to a governance of course
the the distribution of the currency
itself is incredibly important and
that's why earlier I stress that the for
us governance wasn't enough Authority
something was very carefully planned and
the hybrid model and the distribution of
the block reward was carefully planned
such that would have as wide and as fair
as possible of a initial acquaintance
distribution and it's also for this
reason that I kind of urged the etherion
community not to give up on proof of
work just yet because it's an incredibly
effective tool for implementing fair and
litecoin distributions so certainly
considering a point hopeful that
governance model it's not something that
I would recommend moving away from just
yet but something else that's oftentimes
overlooked with proof of work is that it
extends a lifeline for those who might
be relatively persecuted so I suspect
that for many of us who are probably
pretty fortunate to have the Liberty to
pursue an interest in cryptocurrencies
but for a lot of people around the world
they don't
that luxury and for many of them the
idea of having to submit your personal
identity in order to participate in ICO
or to access an exchange platform can
oftentimes be putting their either their
liberty or even their lives at risk
and so something that oftentimes gets
overlooked about proof-of-work mining is
it actually provides a discrete
mechanism for individuals to obtain
cryptocurrency using hardware as a proxy
and then so in the context of a point
quite all the Landtag
a government system what you really want
to have democratize access to the
consumer for the governance process
again for the work is excellent so just
a few closing thoughts before we end for
those of you that are considering
implementing coin all the lead
governance systems a few suggestions
that I would have is implementing a coin
coin holder that government system
becomes exponentially more difficult
after you've released your protocol so
if you if you can try to really really
carefully plan out your initial pointers
distribution and your governance process
before you launch the second one is that
to make sure that you consider your
projects ongoing resourcing so I think a
lot of a lot of projects that I see you
know particularly ones that are raising
outrageous amounts of money
in the form of an ICO is the path across
that just provides instant gratification
something that a lot of them probably
are considering is that those resources
can actually go like with it and then
you can find yourself in the Paris
situation of having financial pressures
being applied from external special
interest groups which can get in the way
of your governance process so for us we
had 10% of that of our local Lord goes
into a decentralized Treasury fund and
that's why they off chain component
about governance comes into play we
released a governance platform we call
polity and so Claudia is the Greek word
for a system or ancient return for a
system of government and politics just
interface where stakeholders can vote on
where the various different funds get
allocated to and funds our ongoing
operation contribution efforts so if you
want more with where can you go to find
out a little bit more information
definitely the documentation is your
best resource we don't actually have a
white paper so this is the closest thing
to it the next best resource we are all
form and form and our credit and then of
course our bridge comes so the bridge
communications channels are kind of cold
we actually have our slack discordant
majors chats all bridge together so
message on one will show up on all the
others and this is a really cool place
to hang out because this is what you see
all about governance activities being
and operations being coordinated in real
time it's very transparent
very cool and finally Cohen stated just
something that I really would have urged
before we end is don't move mustn't
break things that we should sort of
transition away from that Silicon Valley
mentality shift quality code and
considered some implications because
implementing major consensus changes in
this space is not easy it's not it's not
quick and no matter how would we make
our government systems I don't think
it's ever going to do so really really
carefully consider code before you Shiva
and don't compromise you know don't
compromise to fit gimmicky you know
outrageous transaction throughput and
silly features
don't forget what we're here for it's
censorship resistance and
decentralization and thank you if anyone
has any questions or wants to know more
about specifically how to credit the
current governance model works I think
more than happy to take questions
afterwards you can comment on each other
anyways thank you very much
very much Josh that was super
interesting you guys are some really
exciting stuff thanks for sharing it I
really like your clothes they thought
that governments can't brush government
as I said we did we needed to have
patience and be very thoughtful before
we're kind of incrementally involved
yeah I couldn't agree more strongly with
that all right up next we have the one
and only light coin again John my
talking to us about Aragon governance
I'm sure probably everyone in the street
was already familiar with Aragon
probably needs no introduction but their
project that has been really blazing a
trail and just doing some of the most
interesting and exciting work in covered
it's engineering space with dows and
many other things I'm gonna plug your
slides up again it's a pretty common
great thanks a lot Lee so for folks that
were at what three summit or this year
perhaps saw the video that came out this
presentation is going to be kind of a
repeat of the recap of Aragon Network
both
that happened so far I'm going to
briefly cover but however on network
governance works and then just kind of
recap how it has been working so far
for a more complete review of how their
network governance works I did a
presentation about this at our annual
conference our con earlier this year you
can find that video on YouTube but so
yeah let's jump into it airline Network
folks recap
so some background Aaron on network is
the the now that that oversees the
project so this is a decentralized
organization governed by holders of the
Aragon Network token Aragon network is
funded by proceeds of the sale of that
token back in 2017 there was a sale and
that's how ante was initially
distributed so both before area networks
have and holders could govern the
network we needed the tools to govern
the network and so that's what we've
been working on building is tools for
creating and governing decentralized
organizations on aetherium and we have
one of those tools lives today at app
dot Aaron on border so once we have
tools live on maintenance that Aragon
network different holders could use to
participate in marinids we decided to
formalize our governance process and so
first we wrote kind of a foundational
document of
or governance of the Aragon manifesto
this was ratified by AMT holders in June
of 2018 and then later that year we
wrote up how the governance process
[Music]
serious I've been doing here thank you
for clarifying Syria and so later that
year we formalized how the governance
process would actually work under AGP
one two approaches the Aragon governance
proposal process which was ratified in
November of 2017 so this is roughly how
the proposal process itself works so
there are six stages now there are the
the first three stages are just
basically information gathering and
proposal drafting then Stage four this
is slightly out of date Stage four is a
community review period that all
proposals have to go through after the
community review period the urban
Association which isn't a nonprofit that
kind of oversees the project right now
or to the proposals and then any
proposals that get passed the interview
go on to a final ballot and get voted on
by any holders in the network mode and
any proposals that are approved get
executed and any that get rejected go
back to square one so that's a
high-level overview of kind of how the
process works today so so far we've had
three votes under the area of governance
proposal process the fourth
coming up at the end of this month
actually 33 proposals have been
submitted on time so like before the
deadlines 26 have actually made it onto
the final ballot and then 21 proposals
finally were actually approved by AMT
holders and so far about eight and a
half and then they die have been
distributed to this proposal process
and about three and a half million ante
[Music]
participation rate on average across all
of the votes is about four point seven
five percent of all ET tokens in
existence participating in the vote and
our highest turnout rate was seven point
eight four percent the top three most
contentious proposals which I define as
like the closest ratio between yes and
no votes was a flop funding proposal for
a team called autarkic so this was a
team that was seeking a relatively large
grant to join around one which is the
team that I work for as a full-time team
working on Aragon project software and
their proposal was relatively close in
essence no votes with 54% yes 46% no
AG's p16 which was a procedural vote
about modifying the governance
since itself also relatively close and
getting rejected and then a to be 37
which was a retainer for an awfully or a
network security partner this would be
like auditors that are auditing Aragon
software at an ongoing on an ongoing
basis and then maybe like a a honorable
mention with the the proposals to reject
or prevent the aeronaut project from
building on any blog gene that would
that wasn't a theory that that that one
also had I believe it was like 69% no
31% yes so some lessons that we've
learned so far it's it's good to have a
direct communication channel with voters
to cut through the noise so we set up a
mailing list called the airline Network
voters mailing list so that voters can
sign up to give like very low volume
very high signal alerts about when
important events are happening in the
governance process in particular like
when to actually vote so the Aragon
project is doing a lot of stuff if
you're following all of our channels
you're getting a lot of noise and you
might not see the important
announcements about the boat another
thing is to put a thaw retainer of
information about a boat in like one
place and then repeatedly tell people
like where that one place is located so
they can find it again it's just good to
have a thoriated like a source of truth
that people know they can always go to
this spot and fight the most up-to-date
information about a vote
all these scattered channels and maybe
finding out today or out-of-date
information another thing is to keep the
process as simple as possible to lower
the barrier to participation and reduce
the likelihood of mistakes and I'm sure
we could you know spend time designing
some elaborate like group Goldberg
governance system that looks
sophisticated but doesn't actually
accomplish a lot because people just
have such a hard time navigating it that
only like either extremely dedicated or
perhaps manipulative people would
actually get through the process and and
finally ask participants for feedback
and use it to make the process better
after all of those that we've done so
far we sent out a survey asking people
several questions about their experience
in the new governance process whether
they voted or not if you want to hear
from them and as well as like
suggestions about you know what what it
would improve about using the governance
process itself or the user experience of
interacting with the governance process
we've gotten a lot of great feedback
from the surveys and actually
incorporated that feedback into our
product development roadmap as well as
our governance roadmap so this has been
really helpful for us and then some open
questions that we have that I would love
to discuss if folks wanna chat after
this would be like you know how do we
increase participation rate while
maintaining or improving decision
quality you know one thing we could do
is like just pay voters to show up that
we'll probably get more people to show
up but will then actually result in
better decisions it's an open question
how do we protect against various
attacks like vote selling bribing or
collusion bad voting
how do we run meaning
experiments while protecting the
integrity of the airline network you
know add as the last speaker mentioned
we don't want to move fast and break
things we don't want to break our
governance process but we don't want to
stand still either we want to continue
iterating so how do we run meaningful
experiments without breaking the
governance process and then finally you
know how do we continually improve Vogt
communications and user experience the
feedback answers have again have been
helpful for getting some direct feedback
from the voters but you know how can we
how can we make sure that we're
continually doing this so that we're
we're always improving so that's what I
have today about the airline network
governance process like I said we have a
folk later this month so if you want to
see it in action just kind of follow our
channels jump into our forum and you can
see how you know the governance process
is working in real time this month thank
you
thank you again John yeah you're the
very valid point which is that a lot of
the governance ideas you're clearing up
here today are sort of still in the
design phases but I think what's really
exciting about Aragon as well as the
credit some of it of course of course is
that you guys have I've been doing this
for you know over a year now and so jump
in and just payment and observe
governance and Ashley's been really
exciting to see all right up next we
have Ilya a co-founder of near protocol
yeah near is another really exciting
project you guys are very close to
launching I mean then I think right you
guys have a very different vision for
you know the future of blockchain to
charting all that fun stuff but also
governance so you have to get away a
show of hands how many of you know above
near so which bill that's kind of not
even a part of the talk Sameer is kind
of the way we started when we start
looking at kind of Crichton space of
what changes yes there's like
scalability issues there's a lot of
people working that actually one of
those main concern that we had was that
is pretty much like proving hard to
build applications on consoles all right
and coming from that too right little
modifications like firebase parts like
different clouds there's so much to me
there's no much libraries and make a
system we kind of developed here the
kind of associate Roasters right and it
comes into the cart and it takes weeks
or a month special board
and then doubles is like you cannot
actually target to me abusers right at
the end it's all critical users which is
still walking into you so figuring out
how to get people to use this is
important now the thing is like
obviously you cannot figure this out in
it from the beginning from a start like
this is an evolution of the process and
to do that you need the process copy
evolving protocol how do you all your
catalyst to hack the governance now
looking from our perspective defining
governance oh we haven't like Wayne
asked what is the governor's but the
question is how do you define governance
like what is like a in our governance is
a blog like from our perspective it's
actually about a defining condition like
would retract achieve and then culture
of how to make decisions towards an
adult right instead of like oh its own
chain governance you're going to be
voting on stuff it's like hey we want
you know every single person in the
world have a wallet and self custody
their data and assets and we want every
single developer to be building
applications of launching representa
submission and then the culture is how
do you actually get there what is what
are the rules to follow so on the other
side is two new tools right we are
pretty much
the space right and we all love building
tools and the thing is like tools can be
very different but we have Swiss
nominations which is just a tool for
organizing people how to actually make
decisions and be compliant and that's
the following
still relation to the physical world
there's often tools like Twitter got
this great action to know okay then make
some decisions and there's my coaching
and different content but those are all
tools to actually facilitate the process
and I mean overtime incentivizes right
behind some rocks order so kind of one
thing that's used an overload is that
different effects before and different
methods right like if you think of it
the best decision process is not it's
actually consensus and everybody around
the table agrees on the same thing come
into this different view that sort of
conversations we were kind of figuring
out what was the difference in views
actually figure out what is the best
option
I want everybody together and all this
is done scale right you cannot put you
know hundreds of thousands of people in
one room and decision even those 100
people that's already pretty on scalable
and it actually works way better any
person because like we have you know
millions of years figuring out
each other in person and my chats and
Twitter etc become extremely well just
solving over time now doc said mister
those tender doctor sooner we elect
somebody presumably is fast at doing
this function right and this is for
example like for technical decisions
right and like you know Damocles knows a
lot you know I've been thinking about
this a lot I can make those decisions
and then this is great and like this is
made sense for a lot of tasks but in
kind of more global consensus right mr.
interview to still mean to where one
person in on half attempt to capture all
the possible roles and then dessert
oxidizes voting is kind of what we used
to it's great to get decision to make to
build a decision from there's a large
number of people but it's inherited
device right in Lincoln's I think yes or
no
there's no way that kind of had a
nuanced conversation and figured out
maybe there's a better proposal and also
subtle very often the proposal itself is
written by a single person or entity and
kind of in currently has some biases of
that and container of suffering humans
it usually has some kind of nested
interest so that is to kind of combine
this message right and figure out how to
kind of follow the principles and get to
you know submission the goal we have
right so like just to you know exhibit
just those that you're trying to be like
elevated we kind of talked a little bit
about the tools that we want to use for
this but the principles gonna follow
what is to make sure that there's clear
goals like their mission and they're
kind of pokey are symmetrical metrics
that you can target as a community
that's everybody in here like hey we
want to get more users going to get some
with developers and be able to measure
it that's important coming to developers
write down actually see your system
clear your them into decisions that's
bad right so right now like it's
actually really hard to be technical
that's been technical decision sided
because of so comedians conversations
it's weight on way better done was in
the room right like with whiteboard deck
into discussing but like making it
action since paradise replay exists
putting it in about like showing how the
decisions are made not just by K this is
a home is it's safer community
Congrats you wanna make the strategic
decisions right by bringing people for
representing different roles and like
goals talk about this again later but in
person right and get to consensus like
for strategic decisions you want this
consensus where like everybody agrees
that this is the best option right and
they bring whatever the concerns and
half up front and get investment and for
technical decisions right like let's say
hey you know like Louie like we need to
think some five minute this is not
something that like you need that huge
community support right this is
something that you can have an elected
people who are held accountable but at
the same time have can have a really
good decision and it's kind of finished
out is that like all those tools into
building like Aragon is new great job
right does be grab but they all kind of
experiments right we don't really know
what the parts of investment and what
you need to do is we need to test them
first
I'm kind of a little bit of state and
see how how like what decisions I make
is it moving towards a goal you set up
right and then if it does that we can
actually have like a clear path how the
state goes a system or treatment so you
can imagine like what set out where you
put in some amount of money you could
say hey you can manage this down as a
floor making decisions to work towards
the progress of the goals and set up and
then over time as is now it makes one
more decision to improve the metrics you
actually can fund one right to the sole
would you not programmable and kind of
this idea and to just finish up like one
of the things we've been doing we're
actually trying to bring some of the
knowledge in this space but it gives its
parent is a whiteboard series where we
pretty much interviewed one of our homes
and a lot of projects I think is sitting
right now in a whiteboard series we want
to continue doing this as well as what's
been published on all content around
different spaces like comments etc so
check it out and if you have some ideas
what other content would be
right Thank You Millia
Federico is up again to tell us more
about the Larsa governance or Greeks
already nice again the suitors hope
someone interrupted time because Rebecca
long degree bright sunny Carol
what do you know yeah we're out looking
for us or somewhere
[Music]
good so the internal start with the
problem of incomplete contracts and
objects no length talk about wide our
wealth and right all there are some
things that the computers cannot hear is
I mean they're really completed this
alone is humans because everything is
recorded a lot of trucks and many
contracts with regard to need some human
input or making them unfortunately this
becomes an important thing if you think
that three to five percent of
transaction online dispute right
annually some type of penetration and
that's for this type of problems so this
is imaginary Zimbabwe website
the pavement and this crow account and
they both agree that injectors a dispute
each one go to Clara this bill amends
tell it's a jury of experts and they're
going to see the evidence and inform on
who is right and then this Esther is
broken up you pay is because you were
right okay
understood for now so how do you select
yours and that's the question now and
then about how it used to work for
Greece and they had this concept of
coming up trials very sing sing will go
together in a trial but first there was
a very special mechanism so you wouldn't
go to trial you friends to develop them
right so there was a random selection
for of tours so the first word to the
court and they protect you and to be
rude or not and then after you selected
and decided again by blood work
going to sit in which port right there's
a done selection you know what they used
so this woman who wants to be a jury in
this beauty signer so she gets to fight
as tokens and deposit this token what is
token universe one select money very
well-attended aspirin well done so
Curtis has many courts and see deposit
system and they spoken like a quirk of
websites dispute and so is taking the
son of how it works so this is talking
Thomas theis take into the court and
many people take the token and the
doctor gives you the chat with drawn
randomly in sewer and some of them are
going to be selected randomly and these
guys are going to be the traversal is
okay and the token stays long until a
decision is done so how do we say device
people to do as both of the you make
sure that we know how to do know in the
grant randomly aibee aibee just to
collect money for this we use
you're a nice guy
come on this is a blockchain conference
so totally the lyrics of the fifties and
sixties and he developed this concept of
focal point this is a public record
innate when there is uncertainty when
they have to make a decision
independently right so each of you
choose one number and if you choose to
say that the majority to get twenty
dollars which one do you choose
very well
so that's the simple one the number
would be like money to choose but we
expect other to choose 1,000 so we chose
that one and so this generates and
coordinating mechanism it's not done so
if different tourists got independently
on the same dispute knowing that they
have to know that the majority then this
creates an incentive in them to vote on
the truth about the dispute good these
are some interfaces about how works and
there's jurors world with the majority
they get it okay bad and arbitration see
and the jurors are both different they
lose the trophy the worst possible
so this creates basically situational
work users who try to abuse a systemic
reporting randomly they will lose the
token it was mid-morning or average a
statistically more cases and users who
make the one sort of analyzing the
evidence important correctly they will
make money so the vision is create
justice system can solve all the
disputes of all the dolls that are being
created and curves has a cool side and
another top side are always like this
were you have like dubs but have
disputes and they send those arrows
intellisense not the decision about
those visits right this can be used for
escrow transactions this is an interface
with for you can't wait an escrow 200
that is going to be for like girls you
can use this now you should prepare a
contractor for example then token
released this is a people that same
token at least and other can challenge
them if you don't comply with rules and
there are rules for these is really
smooth and we should not kind of
application of these to create a
humanities
how do you make sure that people are not
on the internet so this approach if
you're interested used squares for
detecting making this list and it's use
them to that tonight at what time is
short we have the little for the
humanity system if you want to come to
the fellows house many person going to
be there to collaborate in meeting this
italic this is creating something that
we very suggested into the
stockin is periodically they are use of
Parros to create at least a few months
the internet so this is you need to come
to this place in go to collaborate
tonight at 6:30 at fill ourselves I
tested Civic Center and finally Paris
can be used for parties now there's a
dispute about what is it were provided
in the two participants can I start this
with this product so this is how the
trail system looks right now and this is
how it will look in the future when all
of these other tasks connected to theirs
so basically these to solve the problems
of the dispute of all of the graphs and
this is the standard way to pitch crepes
but there's more to this than resolution
unless this is what I want to tell you
now and I told you before how they
Brittany Marcia world but I didn't tell
you all the story because remember
Christ in his reforms that he created
the assembly and all that but the
democracy isn't working that no one
didn't work became the captain Ernest
the majority the assembly was voting
like blocks it was prosecuted rights of
the minority and descendant regime that
later called it Theotokos Marty being
over my Twitter are the two people
Twitter like every day like yeah
decision right that's how it working is
right after the reform like reference
and it ended up in a very disheartened
leadership of the thirty tyrants that
Killaloe people and in the restoration
and you know how others became actually
a real democracy
and a trade war because they make a
small change in their solutions they
created someone called a man no more
tonight and this was a judiciary review
for all of the seminary's this is hard
work
you have did the proposing innocent
education to the assembly are phony
assembly and then after the route was an
almost passed it was often in the middle
of the Agora where every citizen will
receive and could really and if they
thought that this built on family
Constitution and two challenges and when
they challenge it they'll open to a
trial so you have jury of citizens but
conducted a trial on the new law and
some important thing prosecutors other
defendants and then actually decision so
this decision will not the dog intercept
and it was all powered by the people
this is why very famous problem is if
you control the courts you control the
state because you will join what laws
can be passed in your community
so a very important use case I imagined
Cantara dollar governance is critical is
judiciary review and the promotion vote
now but if someone comes and says ok
let's raise it to medium or something
like shouldn't X Dow invest or give
money to some project so this can be
passed by the buddy commutable
split sale but it passes so those who
voted yes so they have their token that
stays locked into their world and then
the community can see the law that was
passed and if they don't see that they
complies with the Constitution they can
change that law and this will send it to
trial of course
Tara's right and the earth would create
a jury of randomly selected users and
these guys are going to decide if this
proposal is compatible or not with the
tower Constitution and the trial
different parties arguing about things
and Israelis went home and if you voted
for the proposal in the promotion code
and then this is overturned by defended
by the directory producer deposit right
and this and is distributed to those who
challenged and the drug participated in
the trial
so this is how a magic clear us to be
used in the middle of the governance
john was asking before how do you
prevent from but those pass a patent for
to be done for buying so if we have this
layer of tradition based on
disruption our mechanism that this is a
solution for that so basically imagine
that besides although we know about
Gareth about centralized course for
website and that kind of stuff I think
it's going to play a very important role
but these vows generate now some kind of
centralized support services you can
approve and then you get the decisions
made right and ACC's a Supreme Court
that is controlled by the users right
this is controlled by people who are in
the Dow I think it's going to be very
important to have solid governance for
the project so thank you very much about
governance do you have those slides I
did you send me okay sorry I will get
the second circle you would be director
yes
Nancy passion foundation so yeah we're
really excited to have Josh here with us
today why don't you kick off introduce
yourself and all you evil eyes what to
do Twitter DM yeah and thanks to all the
other presenters for their great great
talks so as I mentioned I am the
executive director of the C contra
nomination as honestly I think this is
probably going to be the most boring
lightning talk of everyone's because it
is our governance process is decidedly
the most off chain is the most sort of
meatspace consensus and actually it's
also one that is much more I think
legally enforced that
get it a little bit of that in a second
so first off a toast to governance the
cause of and solution to always performs
much like alcohol a little bit is great
but too much it'll kill you
so let's talk about that I think
generally speaking in you know
cryptocurrency systems you have this
have a number of set of stakeholders and
it's obviously you mean a little bit
broader than this but at least in my
rooms he captures the way that I tend to
divide up different stakeholders that
may have different conflicting interests
at times may have common aligned
interests and what we're kind of relying
on is that each group relies on trust
co2 in some fashion but they also have
some kind of ability to ameliorate any
kind of disagreement that you might have
as as John mentioned before about bigger
wine there's the UAS mm and every
segment that was a clear demonstration
of users overriding what appeared to be
minor and corporate origin
so what in the Z cache like at least in
the easy cash foundation side and on the
electrical intimate side which is in the
for-profit entity that really has been
responsible for the vast majority of
developments in cash attending and we
focus more on the development side so we
have the sort of aspirational model and
give me in the community of this to of
to whom all these central governments
and yet idea behind that is that you
have these two separate but allowing
organizations of development side one
feel like a coin company as mentioned
there they're the ones that really
started everything on the sea cash side
and they are answerable to shareholders
the agency cash foundation that was set
up about a year later after what
several years after happen even appear
after as he catch the protocol that
launched and we're a nonprofit that
answers to our board an issue and we
both are dedicated primarily to certain
see cash so in you know 2019 here's kind
of a list of where I see the roles and
responsibilities of guilt your coin
company on one side and the c-catch
foundation on the other and where
there's an intersection in between and
you know where where this really comes
down to brass tacks in terms of how the
protocols govern is how the electric
coin company decides to build and
maintain the note software that users
choose to run how we the c-catch
foundation choose to build our
independent note software that we are
the process of developing now and then
how we decide to enter
process which is similar to the myth and
ent process and how we come together to
cite future development on the roadmap
protocol so what I and this is maybe
this is not indicative of everyone in
the Sikh educated necessarily but my
personal view is that users running
nodes are the ultimate expression of who
has power in the system it's really up
to users to decide like what kind of
rules they want to follow and I think it
was most clearly demonstrated in the
Atlanta SF situation in 2017 so in
essence the most like real impact that
we have the foundation have in terms of
governance is attached protocol is in
our ability to build and maintain a
consensus we've had one note
implementation for a physiatrist deck
what we're doing with
and what does that mean for sort of the
sip process tomorrow so right now it is
impressive today for all intents and
purposes you know we we do have there
are only an editor of this oppresses
that's represented by the foundation but
ultimately you know whatever the
electric point company decides to
integrate it into CRT is pretty much
what winds up defining the product line
there's a wrinkle to this that I'll get
into about trademarks but for for at
least on the on the pure developments
that that is what that is what matters
and firm you know from the beginning
till now a lot of that process has been
kind of opaque and it's etiquette lesson
needed to be more open because it's
really been more about like technocratic
decisions being made about things like
privacy prudence exactly so we're going
to go in the future is there's going to
be this mutually kind of selective
process about what ECC decides to XE
catch da what we decide to add to zebra
and then there's a mutual upgrade to
sort of network so this is how you know
we keep that band together there's the
power of the actual power of users to
run nodes on one side is the that
plausible threat of an intentional chain
split but there's this other legal
enforcement mechanism with the trademark
which is basically the right now the
trademark is fully owned by ECC but
there is this there's a current
agreement that's being negotiated in
order to give both the ECC
easy cash foundation power deciding what
represents its in cash from a legal
perspective so this is a little snippet
we actually wound up Tulane they
whatever talking about of a second a
community center the collection because
there was disagreement with ECC about
moving forward on the trademark and this
is like one of the most important things
that we could have done it because a
foundation in order to legitimize the
process by which we go through future
upgrades and right now the reason this
is such a hot-button issue is we're in
the process of discussing in the future
of dev fund for the basically an
extension of the Founders Award and who
would stand and benefit from that sort
of awarding me the foundation I want to
make sure that that city is being made
with the degree of legitimacy of hair so
just going into like how we'll decide
what we're gonna put into zebra there's
not my personal ones and everything
ultimately escalates to the board of the
foundation but the board to these
valuable feedback and this is that
community sentiment process that they
were talking about earlier and that that
I mentioned that like very very briefly
with the idea that there are many ways
that we can collect the kind of both on
chain and watch-chain sentiment that can
then be used to and the Board's decision
but we make no mistake that ultimately
like whatever gets decided about what
the foundation decides to put in its
software is going to be decided by by
the board and I suspect that it won't go
against what we view to be community
consensus but that's ultimately where
where that power lies users can still
have the power to fork away and and
choose to and choose to operate and
potentially needed sort of a you ASM
style new verb but you know ultimately
there's this trademark issue that that
makes it harder to do that and thus
really I think I think kind of compels
both PCC and the C cash foundation to
deny entry to some kind of consensus
about work oh okay actually I mean it in
time
I worried there was pressure but anyway
thank you everybody that that wasn't me
kind of trying to blitz through that but
there's there's a lot more that's going
on and there's a cash side I
wholeheartedly recommend that if
anyone's interested check out some of
the blog posts that come out they like
your point company from the sea cash
foundation check out Florence Nazi cash
coupon if you want to see a lot of the
debate about the future dev fund
proposals which we're currently in a
standstill until this tree park
agreement gets
happen very very soon okay thank you
very much
cool so I'm going to talk about
governance obtains so so it Lane asked
me to be super quick anyway can't you
givemea a new research from my city for
economics and I also built the cosmos
appear in my direction rich people so
what is governance so governance can be
designed if - had the decision-making or
coordinate coordination of multiple
agents so that's what we discussed
earlier today I'm sure you're familiar
with decision-making can be defined
mathematically by just talking about our
function
it which maps to a set of outcomes why
do I beat the desirable Aksum I'm
coordination can be defined as among
agents just tell me where multiple
agents have to coordinate in order to
achieve a certain goal cool so um so
let's say we are playing a very generous
business is our game and the game is
defined as so so the fashion space the
space we cooperate and in fact and the
AMD airplane the business
so the Nash equilibrium which is
equilibrium and through which the either
player doesn't have any incentive to
move from its it I defect effect so it's
not zero service America job like I mean
the bottom right corner and it's defined
by that by that function right there
cool so how can this game be modified so
the sister concept of being morphing
where the Nash equilibrium of a game can
be shifted and this game can be modified
as a third player that has information
about the games at least you guys are
playing is able to make an offer to
change the utilities of the initial game
and this is especially possible with
trucks because it's not contracts and
publicly visible strictly enforceable
and also they are frictionless to
implement means that you wouldn't have
to expect any money with with legal
contracts and winning authorities and
they're also strictly enforceable means
that any debt that you make on this
particular work will be credible so
let's say it's player C comes to be
antes hey B I'm going to give you one
point five utility points if you
cooperate with hire a well they're a
defects now even though this is not the
most rational strategy for for be an us
C doesn't exist or if seeded hadn't made
the offer now by proposing this utility
if he makes the freshmen cool so so then
we have this constant game where since
the C is equal to offer what provides
any points for cooperate defect C will
be able to modify the game that a and B
are playing thus the painting the new
Nash equilibria
to arrive a defect equality corporates
so now it has essentially changed to
modify the game
that it does is not the traditional
business and not my anymore and this is
just one way in which games can be work
it's gonna be work even through three
agreements made between two players that
are just attracting with each other
without the third player takes the sting
and there are many other ways as well in
which it's gonna be worked which I
wouldn't go into details right now but
the point is that any spot contract that
can be computed will be computed at this
is kind of the double edge of this of
during complete launching or
completeness of small contracts because
anything that computers will be computed
so we arrive at this dimension what
would you do we consider good power to
be money so I sort of loosely defined of
how the appropriate configurations can
be extremely bad so the number of offers
that have potential players Cerf came
Warburg inmate is defined by the number
of actions that exists within the game
times the wealth of the maximum the
maximum wealth of the war per times a
combination of the players that the
worker chooses to work and this will be
divided by the computation power the
worker because that's a key limitation
that is to attain the number of a
morphing officer why do you make so okay
so on out there cuz this is the game I'm
gonna have the room to make the number
between 0 and 100 and the person that
makes the number closest to a half of
the average wins alright go ahead make
all right yes ok cool how many pay
people picked about 50
show hands ok how many people picked
about 25 ok level 1 you guys didn't make
a random choice if you picked it if you
make them up a decent it might be a
random choice if you picked about 25
it's another one choice how do you think
people picked about house 25 okay
level 2 choice how do people make 0 okay
cool you guys probably on
or you're really computationally smart
okay so the little gate games is winding
on you're able to make inferences that
about your peers about what your peers
are choosing so yeah yeah exactly
so so the grass is located way to go
math Shanthi one of the one of the key
limitations for that is that humans are
usually studied or empirically it has
been verified that humans are usually
level three and computers can be as
level high as the compute power that
they possess so also when we're dealing
with a lot of these watching our smart
contract systems I have tended to work
under the assumption that information is
complete because everything is was a
wonderful thing about chain but for
information is actually incomplete
because a lot of billions can be private
even though the briefs are broadcasted
they can still be private because you
don't know the true belief so you can
assign a high degree of certainty tenant
and also reality is a fabrication of the
collective perception of all of the
agents within the system
so there are things such as the value is
also a perception is that it's something
that we have assigned the definition of
a thing is also other perceptions it is
supposed to define by the agents and so
essentially we are not able to meet very
definitive inferences about those things
unless what we do do so by Americo study
in which case it would be a probability
distribution cool so and then there's
also this big challenge of formalizing
that irrationality so so why do I call
this humans and machines in humans it's
basically human designers
designing machine systems that are
supposed to coordinate other humans and
the big challenge with that or mapping
through this is formalizing about
irrationality and the way we can do that
is two ways one can use Gibbs free
energy in which case you look at it as a
constrained optimization or you can
measure effectiveness if it gives you
got payout divergence which is basically
the Delta between and expected outcome
versus the true outcome of the game and
the constraint optimization is basically
you end up at the constraint
it's a compute power that of the agent
that means kind of calculation and then
we also have the complexity of value
this is basically an argument saying
that you cannot represent value that a
human has or what a human body is
mathematically and thus it becomes hard
to implement that in a simulation cool
so so we're essentially when we're
talking about these kinds of systems
they do not a scale-free networks being
their networks where 80% of the nodes
for 20% of possession and 20% of those
the connections and there are ways in
which these networks can be resilient
but first we have to define resilience
so resilience we can measure it us up as
either of the ability to not be
fragmented or the ability to tolerate
faults or the looking to survive attacks
so we are not going to consider around
the networks think of usually ball
chains are most and largest scale-free
networks so with the scale-free networks
the attack survivability of watching is
pretty pretty bad so that's the that's
the one thing that we should consider
with with thinking about resilience of a
block chain so basically attack
survivability is the fact that since
since there are such few nodes there
that possess most number of connections
then if you attack those notes than the
entire system essentially fails
however with regards to network
fragmentation and fault tolerance
because of this property of a few nodes
having high degree of connections the
network within would essentially not
really change if you remove a couple of
notes about the system or if a few
random notes get influenced are attacked
cool so this is awesome and he in 500 BC
he proposed South organization and South
governance so how do you hide me
self-organized so we aren't very good at
some organization as we have observed in
current systems so but then there are
ways in which we can self-organize and
we can also guide it so I have to give
credit to my friend Virgil Griffith for
for introducing me to the concept
organization which first implemented in
terms of studying some information
theoretic systems but essentially
self-organization can be guided in three
ways so either you can talk about or
change the change the control parameter
of this is due in which case the X will
be made and just another X which is
better so earlier I explained it
actually graphically I think that that
might help a little bit better so
essentially if you have a system where
it has been stuck in a local minima and
it's just not even know from here you
just take this and look but it but it up
here so so that get system goes back to
that Nam except better that are more or
just eat that's more desirable or you
can have or you can actually change the
function itself so this is changing X or
you can change the function that governs
X so instead of having it like this you
can transform it to something like this
or any other function so isn't to you
you would change the dynamics which
governed any specific control parameter
and you can change this for any number
of functions or you can change the
entire structure of the self governing
system itself in which case you you
change the set of all the functions that
that constitute the government the
governance model so all the policies
that are defined within the system can
be changed and that case is extremely
limiting in the sense that it will not
allow for you to see emergent effects
because your constant
want to find the way in which the coming
governance model is worse with regards
to just interrupts you can you can be
able you can still observe quite a lot
of governance and flex or emergent
effects despite there being a little bit
of intervention within the systems so
those are do you ways in which you can
guide the self-organizing system to
better to better States or to having a
better governance model okay cool
remember this guy so so think about
guiding the process in which systems can
be governed instead of allowing it to
complete the self organized by itself
thank you my name is I'm a software
engineer at court and today I'm gonna be
talking about the other half of
governance that Lane talks about whether
that watch chain can provide governance
and this
they're watching and provide robot so
what is Google bot this is a very
nebulous topic so there's the straight
paper called micro foundations of the
world walk and by Gillian Hatfield and
very wet nest and in it they basically
say that Lola is a classification
institution so what they mean by this is
like it takes the facts of the case it's
it's a function that takes the facts of
the case and then it outputs our
decision so in this case it would be is
this lawful or unlawful is this
constitutional or unconstitutional and
they submit a good classification
institution it has these six
characteristics so it makes the
decision-making Hajek publicly available
so if you're trying to decide whether or
not to do something you need to know
whether you know what you're going to do
is lawful or unlawful right it results
in computing its Abel it's impersonal
it's able to produce new rules by
soliciting information for users and
against critical results for novel
inputs okay so they say they say
importantly that it's a mistake to
presuppose that government is an
essential feature of law and legal order
so this is firmly multi-point and you
might notice that these
strangely but the reason why they are
acting this way is because the heat my
project didn't use to instruct them on
how to do things it just cents to give
them the whole of moving forward without
falling and so you can see they you know
we got really really different behavior
because because we focused on the goal
and not the mechanisms of how to do it
and we can actually apply the same
things a lot and this is a natural
approach it's called the functional
approaching comparative plot and what it
says is that law is comparable if it
performs the same functions so if it
solves the same social problems I'm just
going to give one example of this so
this is the law speaker and this was
around the Year 1000 years old
in Scandinavian countries like Iceland
and what the law speaker did was as you
might imagine spoke little off so this
was how they carried a lot down through
generations was that they had a law
speaker it wasn't hard today so this is
very different than what we're familiar
with but it's still counted as well okay
so given that that definition let's talk
about the social problems to solve so
there's this great paper by Anthony
Carlin who's a Illinois Austrian
contract law
he has this paper called contract law in
the state of nature and vinicky says
that there's two problems in this goes
back to Hobbes he says that one of the
problems is vulnerability of possession
so you know people can take your stuff
great and the other problem is
transactional security so this means
that
trying to make promises with other
people they may break their promises so
how can we solve this so let's get the
definitions out and play so I'm going to
be defining a blockchain very loosely
and very abstractly as a state machine
so it takes all the states and new
information it has a transition function
and you get a new space I'm also going
to be defining manches vs. off change
assets
so as unchain asset by that I just mean
that it watching is the sole source of
truth for ownership or access and by off
chain I mean that's something else
determines ownership for access so this
is really about social consensus and
source attribute okay so let's make a
simple on a piece cryptocurrencies let's
say that Alice wants to get funked into
enlisted rank so the whole state Alice
has to involve a zero it goes through a
transition function now about the same
rate varies reporter let's look at it
invalid transaction so let's say that
Bob tries to take ten tokens from Alice
without her consent so as we all know
this would not work great
so because Alice has not signed the
transaction it's not going to be
validated by the bot producer to
dominators fingers whatever was at every
so what's really cool about this is that
it turns out that for differences
because they units they're actually
enforcing property rights on the
internet in code and without traditional
law
so agent honoring has this great
tapeworm called ownership and it makes
talks about I think there's like six or
eight different rights that are in the
bundle of ownership and it turns out
that particular duties have three of
those rights so there's the right to use
there's the right to exclude others and
there's the power transfer so a Bakura
we decided to see what would happen if
we try to suppress more sophisticated
property rights so we chose to implement
the pencil demo based on right into our
place this is a picture redditor place
and in this demo we decided to allow
users to buy and sell pixels as well as
phone pixels and can't create whatever
they wanted to create but what we
discovered was that this was actually
implementing another one of Monterey's
rights and the bundle ship with
ownership and this was the right to to
alienate the you straight maintained
ownership but allow someone else to use
it it turns out that this is kind of the
the owner tenant subtenant relationship
so this is very important so we talked
about 1 million possession
proud parents what about transactional
security in contractor so the simplest
example of transactional and security is
what I call the squad and there's this
great example from Raiders of the Lost
Ark it's not actually the squash that's
what happens right after it so I had a
video but I want to try to play it for
time reasons but it's all enacted pretty
guys but Indiana Jones is trying to get
over this pin right and he has the idol
his system is on the other side it has
the win that would help them get across
and so he says give me the whip and this
guy says throw me the idol
so Indiana Jones throws the Idol over
and as we might expect so this is the
problem of transactional and security
and we solve it so it gets all this if
we use a smart contract
so what's really special ears that a
smart contract and essentially bones the
assets and allow us to transfer them
so if alice has X and broth has one we
can send it to the smart contract then
the smart contract can actually do the
dispersal safely so this is really
really cool cuz that means we've solved
the social problem of transactional
insecurity without using traditional
context and so you might be saying well
you know that was just a simple swap
what about what about promises that
unfold over time what about mark
complexly and and you would be right
that's a big questions let's open up the
black box of contract enforcement and so
there's two steps there's a
classification step and then there's
appliance and control and this comes
from a great talk by Professor Oliver
Peck not called ambiguity and legal
specification but what is list is that
so there's the event classification step
break that says has X happened or not
and then there's applying the correct
rules so if X happens then dy and it
turns out that humans are much better at
classification than computers aren't so
like for example in entender law it's
really important to know that the
apartment is happening so you're doing
you would have to have sensory or like
carbon monoxide for vermin for you know
you can remote you can imagine all the
things that you have to do about a trap
but you can actually just have that you
might mean that you can inspect your
going on saying oh this looks popular
right so that would be a lot easier so
humans are graded classification but
they're terrible at rural application so
as we all know there's a lot of
corruptions misunderstandings all sorts
of constraint so it turns out that we
can have the best of both worlds and
this is where things like lettuce come
in so we can have any human classifier
human classifier saying yes this is
habitable and that can be part of that
input in the smart contract we can also
have human dispute resolution systems
such that if something is triggered to
gets indexed in dispute resolution and
then comes back into the smart contract
so we talked about vulnerability of
protection we talked about transactional
security and help property rights of
contractors solutions to those but do we
actually have you a lot so going back to
the rules of the go to the class of each
institution so number one is the
decision making market publicly
available this is obviously true for
watching right we have to be able to
replicate it so it has to be publicly
available number two does it resolve
ambiguity so things have to be
determined this
you can't really allow for anything
committee so I would say that this is
yes
number three is it stable so or anything
on watching to be used to solving social
problems it has to be long-lasting so I
think this still remains to be seen okay
number four gives predictable results
for novel infants so this is kind of yes
and no so on a watching we can we can we
can say FX and we can say if not X and
that's the entire universe so the
possibilities right but at the same time
there's probably going to be things that
we don't expect so I think this one is a
baby we're working on it
number five so a smart contract for
anyone watching it isn't personal right
done so on and watching you don't even
know do someone else we don't even know
if it's a machine or a person so it's
very impersonal and number six it can
produce new bubbles by soliciting
information from users and if this one
is also one that watching ecosystem this
week on we can produce neutrals by
transitioning to be block chains or news
or upgrading to new smart contracts but
that's very difficult that still remains
to be seen how how good we are
so inclusion
we took the functional approach we
talked about the rule of law as a
classification institution we talked
about the social problems to solve
right so the owner ability possession
and transactional and security and it
turns out that for on J assets we can
require sophisticated property rights
that we can solve simple transaction on
security we're still early on as I'm
sure all you know censorship resistant
articles often and we're working on
solutions for off chain assets but the
really cool thing is that I'm watching
as a smart contract platform can provide
at least parts of the robot so thank you
so much
[Applause]